University of Central Florida

STARS
Retrospective Theses and Dissertations
1993

The Cry-Wolf Phenomenon and its Effect on Alarm Responses
James P. Bliss
University of Central Florida, JBliss@odu.edu

Part of the Human Factors Psychology Commons

Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/rtd
University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu
This Doctoral Dissertation (Open Access) is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Retrospective Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more
information, please contact STARS@ucf.edu.

STARS Citation
Bliss, James P., "The Cry-Wolf Phenomenon and its Effect on Alarm Responses" (1993). Retrospective
Theses and Dissertations. 3614.
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/rtd/3614

The Cry-Wolf Phenomenon and its Effect on Alarm Responses

BY
James P. Bliss
B.A., University of Central Florida, 1987
M.S., University of Central Florida, 1989

DISSERTATION
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in
Human Factors Psychology in the Graduate Studies
Program of the College of Arts and Sciences
University of Central Florida
Orlando, Florida

Fall Term
1993

Major Professor:

Richard D. Gilson

ABSTRACT
Responses to alarms are assumed important.

Yet failure

to respond to alarms is recognized, although is not well
understood or quantified.

Conditions that might induce a

failure to respond include alarm unreliability (i.e.,
numerous false alarms, the "cry-wolf" effect), high primary
task demand, or low criticality of the alarm itself.

The

goals of this research were to substantiate the existence of
the cry-wolf effect, quantifying its effect on operator
performance, and to examine the relation between the cry-wolf
effect and alarm criticality.

One hundred thirty-eight UCF

students alternatively performed two primary tasks, chosen
from the Automated Performance Test System.

Subjects were

presented alarms of varying reliabilities (25%, 50%, and 75 %
true alarms) and urgencies
experimental blocks .

(low, medium, and high)

in three

A series of repeated-measures MANOVAs

assessed the effects of increasing alarm reliability,
criticality, and performance block on alarm response and
primary task performance.

A _p ost-experimental questionnaire

also provided correlational dat_a to determine relationships
between demographic and opinion items and alarm response
performance.

The results indicate that most subjects (about

90%) do not respond to all alarms but match their response
rates to the expected probability of true alarms

(probability

matching).

Further, alarm criticality and primary task

difficulty modestly but significantly alter response rates,
and the speed and accuracy of responding.

About 10% of the

subjects responded in the extreme, utilizing an all-or-none
strategy.

Implications of these results for alarm design

instruction and further research are discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
In the warning research literature, many words have been
\

I

used to describe attention-getting stimuli.

In fact, the

terms "warning," "alarm," and "alert" often seem to be used
interchangeably, with little consensus as to their precise
definition.

In this work, the term "alarm" will be applied

to alerts of a dynamic nature, i.e., lights and sounds.
contrast,

In

" warnings" will refer to more permanently displayed

warnings, e.g., written labels.

Finally, the term "alert"

will apply to the broad class of attention-getting stimuli
that includes both alarms and warnings.
Alerting systems are widespread in society.

Warning

labels have proliferated manufactured products in the past
few decades largely because of increased societal concerns
about consumer safety. These concerns have been stimulated in
part by well-publicized product liability litigation followed
by voluntary labeling practices or by regulation.

Likewise,

the prevalence of visual and aural alarming systems has also
increased in recent times, because of the same societal
concerns and because technology _has enabled such alarming
systems to be easily implemented.

Mushrooming automation

also has added to this trend in an attempt to keep people "in
the loop."
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As a result of the factors noted above, alerting systems
are present in virtually every aspect of life.

In "everyday"

situations, an alert may include any stimulus that signals an
out-of-tolerance (abnormal)

condition, or a condition that

requires human attention and intervention. Examples of aural
alerts include telephones, clocks, smoke detectors, and
computers, and may take the form of spoken text, or nonspeech signals.

Examples of visual alerts include any visual

stimuli that are coded to increase detectability,
written warnings

from

(c.f., Wogalter & Silver, 1990) to appliance

and other everyday device indicator lights

(Norman,

1988),

such as kitchen light signals and automobile instrument
message panels.
Another widespread application of visual and aural
alerting systems is disaster alerts for the public at large.
Research in this area has been conducted as early as the
1940s (c.f., Allport & Postman, 1947), attaining popularity
in the early 1960s (c.f.,

Janis,

1962).

Recent research on

disaster alerts has targeted the economic and psychological
mechanisms present in the human processing of alarms and
warnings for floods
earthquakes

(Krysztofowics & Ferrel,

1983),

(Pate, 1982), and other natural disasters

(Quarantelli, 1982).
A final example of the burgeoning alert industry is the
use of alarms and warnings in complex task environments.
list of technology areas that incorporate alerting systems

A
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must include, at a minimum, manufacturing and power plant
control systems, military systems, biomedical devices, and
transportation vehicles

(trains, automobiles, and aircraft).

Because of the safety consequences of human failure to heed
alarms in many complex task situations, these areas have
traditionally received more research attention than other
areas.

Past Research with Alarms
Psychology has traditionally focused research, with
regard to human reaction to alarms, in three broad areas.

Detection
The first area is the capability of humans to detect
alarms.

Although initial work determined human physiological

capabilities to detect various alarms

(c.f., Mills,

1958;

Munson, 1947), perhaps the most salient example of alarm
detection research involves Signal Detection Theory (Green &
Swets, 1966) .
Signal Detection Theory views stimuli detection as a
matter of separating the signal of interest from background
noise (Gerow, 1992).

According to the theory, a detector

(e.g., a human operator) makes a decision about the presence
or absence of a signal (S)

in noise

(N) by comparing an

observation (X) to some preset criterion (C).
(N) and signal+ noise

Both the noise

(S + N) distributions are assumed to
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be normal; the normalized distance between distribution means
(d') is frequently the measure of absolute detectability.

If

the observation exceeds a specified criterion value (X > C),
detection of signal is considered successful.

If not, and

the observation is less than the criterion (X < C), the
signal is considered not present.
In real life, the value of a person's preset criterion
(C)

is based upon a number of factors besides the distance

(d') between the means of the signal and signal+ noise
distributions.

Individual factors relating to the human

detector may affect the criteria, such as fatigue, prior
experience in detecting the signal, as well as motivational
bias to detect

(or not to detect) the signal. Therefore,

signal detection performance is a factor of physical
differences between Sand S + N distributions (d 1

),

and a

person's current criterion level, C, which is a function of
individual factors.
Using Signal Detection Theory, an aural or visual alarm
would typically be considered the signal, and noise would
include any ambient stimuli (or other alarms) over which the
alarm must dominate to be detected by the operator.
and Woods

Sorkin

(1985) recommend that, . in order to determine

detector performance efficacy, receiver-operating
characteristics (ROCs) be computed.

This metric analyzes

"hit" rate (rate of correct detection) versus false alarm

5

rate (rate of incorrect detection)
levels

for different criterion

(typically altered by varying payoffs).

Recent work by Sorkin and his colleagues
Sorkin, 1985; Sorkin, Kantowitz,

(Robinson &

& Kantowitz, 1988; Sorkin &

Woods, 1985) was carried out with the goal of improving the
collaboration between human and mechanized monitors in signal
detection.

Using SDT models, Sorkin et al.

(1988)

indicated

that using both humans and machines to detect signals may be
more useful than using either alone.

Other research has

added applied data for detection, e.g., Antin, Lauretta and
Wolf (1991) clarified the relationship between aural alarm
signal intensity and operator detection, in an automobile
context.

Their work has resulted in the determination of

optimal alarm levels, given varying amounts of ambient noise.

Perception and Cognition
A second category that has received attention in the
alarm research literature is human perception and cognitive
processing of aural and visual alarms.

In particular, much

work has been done to optimize the perceived urgency of
alarms, by manipulating various aspects of their physical
makeup (Sanders

&

McCormick, 1993).

Because application of

aural and visual alarms is most common in high-complexity and
potentially dangerous environments such as nuclear power
generation and aviation, most of the literature concerning
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alarm design stems from safety requirements such as
noticeability and response efficiency.
For visual alarms, the literature is rife with research
examining the use of variables such as color (Ellis & Chase,
1971; Jones, 1962), brightness
flash rate

(Crawford,

(Davis,

1947; Stevens, 1951),

1962, 1963; Gerathewohl,

1953),

placement

(Meister and Sullivan, 1969; Vallerie,

Webster

Haslerud, 1964) and other alarm coding conventions

&

1968;

to increase perceived urgency.
Likewise, researchers have expended much effort to
identify methods of manipulating aural alarm urgency.
Aspects of aural signals manipulated include volume
(Patterson, 1982), pitch (Veitengruber, Boucek, & Smith,
1977), complexity (Edworthy, Loxley, & Dennis, 1991;
Momtahan,

1990), sound burst structure

(Patterson, 1982),

dichotic presentation (Begault & Wenzel, 1990; Doll, Hanna,
Russotti,

&

1992), and sound envelope shape (Edworthy et al.,

1991; Patterson, 1982).
Other investigated aspects related to both visual and
aural alarm processing have included alarm prioritization,
onset and offset patterns, and duration.

In the transport

aviation context, guidelines for _these elements exist in the
form of FAA technical reports
Boucek, Hanson, Leffler,
1977).

(c.f., Berson, Po-Chedley,

& Wasson, 1981; Veitengruber et al.,

Applications in more generic contexts may draw on

military standards documents

(c.f., MIL-C-81774,

1973; MIL-
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STD-1472D, 1982) and reports from the Society of Automotive
Engineers

(c.f., ARP 450 and 1068, 1971; ARP 571,

1973; ARP

1161, 1972).
In addition to urgency coding, alert processing research
has been conducted to investigate the magnitude of
information transfer given particular configurations of
alarms

(Pollack

&

Ficks, 1954).

As of late, researchers have

concerned themselves with the effects of speech displays on
cognitive processing (Luce, Feustel, & Pisani, 1983), the use
of multi-modal alarms to enhance cognitive processing
(Selcon, Taylor,

& Shadrake, 1992), and virtual reality

applications, such as incorporating a "God's-eye" viewpoint
display (Barfield, Furness, Rosenburg,

& Han,

1992).

Response
The third area that psychologists have studied concerns
human responses to alarms.

Literature in this area spans

many years, beginning with early work concerning auditory
distraction for visual tasks
the 1960s, as noted above,

(Cassel & Dallenbach,

1918). In

some researchers were interested

in the response patterns shown by humans to disasters, and
the alerts that preceded them (Janis,
subsequent to that period,

1962).

During and

research often involved reaction

or response times to various presentations and forms of
visual and/or aural stimuli (c.f., Drazin,
1957; Kohfeld,

1971) .

1961; Klernrner,
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Over the years, as technology became more complex, more
use was made of alarms in complex task situations;
accordingly, researchers began to concentrate on optimizing
specific aural and visual alarm structures,

so that operator

reaction time and accuracy could be improved.

These efforts

seem to have reached a peak in the late 1970s and early
1980s, with researchers establishing guidelines for alarm
designs

(c.f., Berson et al., 1981; Veitengruber et al.,

1977).

Following that period, most of the alarm response

research focused on testing operator responses to new types
of alarms.
Displays

For aural alarms, these included Likelihood Alarm

(LADs)

(Sorkin et al.,

1988), prototype alarms that

made optimal use of spectral parameters

(Edworthy et al.,

1991), dichotically presented aural stimuli
1990), and speech displays

(Byblow & Corlett, 1989; Hakkinen

& Williges, 1984; Simpson & Williams,
alarms,

(Begault et al.,

1980).

For visual

recent efforts have also focused on the effects of

new technology, with complex visual displays such as
electronic map displays
(HUDs),

(Aretz,

1991), head-up displays

(Iavecchia, Iavecchia & Roscoe, 1988), and quickened

and predictive displays

(Weiner & Nagel, 1988).

Description of the "Cry-Wolf" Phenomenon
Consideration of past alarm research shows that the
majority of studies are based on some key assumptions that
may not be found in the "real world".

With the exception of
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some work by Janis (1962), Breznitz (1983) and Pate-Cornell
(1986), researchers have been concerned with human responses
to true alarms; those alarms that are assumed to provide
accurate, timely information.

Such alarms are presumed to

consistently signal an imminent, genuine threat, and to
require a response.

However, such a narrow emphasis is not

realistic due, in part, to the fallibility of alarming
systems, e.g., false alarms. Everyday examples of alarm
failure in the form of false alarms may be seen in many
contexts.

In the safety realm, many fire/smoke alarms are

notorious for activating when no fire is present.

Another

area where alarm failure may be seen is weather warnings.
Often, television viewers and radio listeners are advised to
watch for or even warned about storms that do not materialize
(Janis, 1962; Breznitz, 1983).

Finally, the recent

popularity of house burglar alarms and automobile theft
alarms, and even construction vehicle backup alarms

(Duchon &

Laage, 1986) has resulted in a myriad of false alarm
situations.
As noted by Breznitz (1983) and Pate-Cornell

(1986),

such situations lead to a "cry-wolf effect", which is
manifested as a change in operator attitude and alarm
reaction patterns.

Some researchers have defined that change

as a cessation of responding (i.e., Pate-Cornell, 1986),
where others acknowledge a less dramatic degradation of
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response

(Breznitz, 1983).

The particular potency of the

effect may be related to the criticality of the situation.
In most of the alarm situations described above, false
alarms are a mere inconvenience, often ignored after repeated
exposure.

However, there exists a category of alarm failure

situations with serious and far-reaching implications.

The

consequences of false alarms in complex task environments
such as aircraft, trains, cars, and operating rooms are more
serious, leading to improper action when human lives are at
stake (c.f., CBS Evening News, 1993).

Eventually, as the

cry-wolf story goes, repeated false alarms will result in
little or no action when a prompt response is needed to a
true alarm.

Unfortunately, the incidence of false alarms in

these environments is growing.

Alarm systems now have the

capability to warn about minute abnormalities, and in complex
task environments, are generally set for maximum sensitivity.
Presumably such settings allow lead time for response.
Often, the resulting buzzers, beeps and bells activate one
after another, or even simultaneously, in annoying
regularity.

Many of these alarms do not signal a dangerous

situation or may be inappropriate, fostering complacency and
mistrust by operators

(Sorkin, 1988).

Specific examples of complex task situations where
operator complacency and/or confusion have been noted include
medical care units (Kerr, 1985), airplanes

(Billings, 1991),

automobiles (Caelli & Porter, 1980), and nuclear power plants
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(Kantowitz, 1977).

It is logical to assume that operators in

other complex task environments face the same dangers.
Particular examples might include trains (Carson, personal
communication, 1992), and ships (Wickens, 1992).
As noted above, the consequences of alarm failure in
complex task environments are especially critical, because
safety is often in jeopardy.
fail in one of two ways.

Typically, an alarm system may

It may either fail to provide an

alarm when a threat exists, or it may provide an alarm when
no threat exists.

In Signal Detection Theory parlance, these

errors are known as Type I and Type II, respectively. In
order to increase the effectiveness of alarm systems, both
types of error must be addressed and minimized.

To do this,

it is necessary to investigate the possible causes of such
errors.

Because alarm systems are an example of a classic

human-machine interaction, the inadequacy may lie in either
the machine realm (hardware reliability and sensitivity), or
in the human realm (discrimination and validity assessment)
or both.
If an alarm system fails to activate when a threat
situation exists (Type I error), it is typically assumed that
there is a mechanical/electrical error present in the alarm
system.

Either the system components have malfunctioned, or

the alarm circuitry was not · sensitive enough to detect the
abnormality.

However, in the case of a Type II error, the

situation is quite different.

The alarm has activated, and
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presumably the human has sensed it (although with multiple
alarms the situation may be less clear).

It is now incumbent

on the human to perceive that alarm as a genuine threat, or
as a false alarm, and to act accordingly.

Therefore, in the

case of a Type II error, human perception works in
conjunction with cognitive function; the first result is the
operator's identification of the alarm, then an assessment of
alarm validity as a true alarm or a false alarm.
Assessment of alarm validity presents a particularly
interesting phenomenon; that is, realistically determining
the type of response an operator will make to a given alarm.
The first time a human identifies a particular alarm,

it is

usually treated as a true alarm, provided there are no
redundant cues or foreknowledge to indicate otherwise.
However, over time, as the human is faced with growing
numbers of false alarms

(which may be dutifully, though

inappropriately, responded to), mistrust in the alarm system
develops.

Breznitz

(1983)

"learning from experience".

attributes this mistrust to
Such learning is an inherent

factor in the cry-wolf effect:

the failure to heed a warning

because of past unreliability.

As Breznitz notes, the

widespread use of highly sensitive, early warning systems has
made the cry-wolf effect a prevalent phenomenon. A
particularly poignant example of this is related by Seminara,
Gonzalez, and Parsons

(1977, cited in Kantowitz & Sorkin,
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1983, p. 245) with regard to nuclear power plant control
panel alarms:
In many cases alarm set-points were known by operators
to be too sensitive to normal transients. As a
consequence slight deviations or transients, thought of
as normal, would set the alarm off even though no
further operational action was required. Maintenance or
calibration operations often caused recurring alarms
that were a nuisance.
The net result of the many false
alarms is a "cry-wolf'' syndrome which leads to a lack of
faith in the system and a casual attitude towards the
constant presence of certain alarms. (p. 245)
Breznitz (1983) notes that the cry-wolf phenomenon has
been included in the folklore of many countries, most notably
in Aesop's Fables.

In addition, he cites examples where

military leaders have actually used the effect to their
advantage, by creating enough false alarms for complacency
and then catching opposing forces unaware. However, in the
typical context of complex task warning systems, the cry-wolf
effect is accompanied by potentially dire consequences.

One

particularly relevant example involves a series of incidents
involving aircraft separation by Air Traffic Control in and
around Atlanta Hartsfield Airport in the late 1970s (cited in
Billings, 1991, p. 100). Upon investigation, the National
Transportation Safety Board reported that:
The flashing visual conflict alert [on the Air Traffic
Controller's panel] is not conspicuous when the data tag
is also flashing in the handoff status. The low
altitude warning and conflict alerts utilize the same
audio signal which is audible to all control room
personnel rather than being restricted to only those
immediately concerned with the aircraft. This results
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in a 'cry-wolf' syndrome in which controllers are
psychologically conditioned to disregard the alarms.

(p.

100)

Theoretical Implications of Alert Failure
From the above examples, there can be no doubt that the
cry-wolf effect is both a real and widely-acknowledged
phenomenon.

Yet, its basis in psychology is scattered among

a number of theoretical camps.

Therefore, for a complete

discussion of the cry-wolf effect in relation to alarm
responses, those theories must be addressed.

The following

discussion will present the relation between various
theories, the cry-wolf phenomenon, and alarm failures .

Reinforcement Theory
Breznitz

(1983)

refers to cry-wolf situations

collectively as the "False Alarm Effect"

(FAE).

He states

that the FAE may be a credibility loss due to a false alarm,
and as such may be explained in terms of two- psychological
phenomena.

These two phenomena are central tenets of

reinforcement theory, as proposed by the early researchers in
classical and operant conditioning.

The first is

habituation, described by Mackworth (1969) as a decrease in
sensitivity to repeated stimulation.

In the case of alarm

systems, after being repeatedly exposed to an unimportant
stimulus

(a false alarm), the organism habituates to that
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stimulus, and therefore does not respond to it

(except

perhaps to cancel its activation).
The second phenomenon is based in classical conditioning
theory, and is termed extinction, where a previously learned
association between a stimulus and response is no longer
present.

When this happens with real-world stimuli

(alarms),

the operator loses the association between the alarm and the
negative consequences it is designed to warn about.

Decision Making Under Uncertainty
When an alarm activates during a complex task situation,
the operator may make two decisions.

The first may be to

ascertain the validity of the alarm.

The second involves

selecting the appropriate responsive action, which may depend
on the alarm's relative importance at the time. Both of these
decisions relate directly to the cry-wolf phenomenon.

As

more false alarms are noted, operators probably judge
subsequent alarms as less valid, and may respond to them with
less vigor or even haphazardly.
When considering the significance of these decisions,

it

is clear that the concept of uncertainty is important to the
cry-wolf effect.

Some of the more active researchers in this

area are Tweney and his colleagues at Bowling Green
University.

In their research, they have investigated the

decision making behavior of individuals faced with varying
levels of system error.

According to Doherty and Tweney
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(1988), the impetus for such research comes from a historical
interest the field of psychology has toward human reaction
and response to system or task uncertainty.
That interest has been shown over the years in a variety
of research contexts.

For example, early work that dealt

with choice reaction time (c.f., Donders, 1968) involved
subjects making a choice about how to respond to a stimulus,
given a level of uncertainty about the specifics of its
appearance.
In addition, the very essence of Signal Detection
Theory, as described before, concerns the behavior of an
individual as he or she attempts to detect a signal, given
uncertain conditions
sounding noise).

(e.g., in the presence of similar-

A central tenet of Signal Detection Theory

is a statistical approach to psychophysical research. Signal
detection statistics are used to measure uncertainty, and to
predict when humans are likely to detect a stimulus. Signal
Detection Theory uses this approach to account for aspects
other than the physical properties of the stimulus that
affect detectability.

These include personal factors,

such

as detector motivation or bias, detector workload,
differences in sensory capacities, ability or willingness to
take risks, and others.
Doherty and Tweney (1988)

indicate that, in most

research concerning task performance, uncertainty has usually
been referred to as "source reliability"

(c.f., York, Doherty
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& Kamouri,

1987).

Experimenters typically code specific

levels of source reliability into task instructions.

For

example, if an experimenter wanted to code an alarm system as
being 30 percent reliable (false alarms 70 percent of the
time), subjects would be informed of that fact before
participation, in the experimental instructions.
Such work is quite analogous to the cry-wolf situation.
Indeed, Walker and Harper (1990), in their work with system
failure, make direct reference to Type II (false alarm)
errors.

They present the situation where a pilot is faced

with an oil pressure warning light that malfunctions
occasionally, giving a false positive reading.

Walker et al.

then go on to speculate about the nature of the pilot's
evaluative procedures.

Such work has also been carried out

by Smith and Rockwell of Ohio State, with pilot decision
making under problematic conditions

(c.f., Giffin & Rockwell,

1984).
Although the research cited above is in some ways a
direct analogue of the cry-wolf situation, the primary thrust
has been the evaluation of decision-making performance and
problem solving.

There has been little or no assessment of

the effects of uncertainty on complex .task performance.
work would be a natural continuance of problem-solving
research.

Such
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Warning Compliance
The warning compliance literature seems to be largely
concerned with warnings of a written nature (i.e., product
warning labels).

Much of this work has been performed by

Wogalter and his colleagues at North Carolina State
University and Rennsalaer Polytechnic Institute, and involves
investigating the patterns of human response or nonresponse
(warning compliance).

The emphases in this type of research

generally pertain to attentional or situational factors that
influence subject responding, and as such, are relevant to
alarm research, if one notes the similarities between written
warnings and aural or visual alarms.
Because warning compliance is closely related to safety,
one of the primary issues addressed by the warning compliance
research community involves the saliency (urgency) of the
particular warning.

As noted by Rodriguez (1991), most

people simply ignore warnings; therefore one prime goal is to
devise warnings that are so salient as to prevent subjects
from ignoring them.
Another prime goal is to lower the "cost" (or
difficulty) associated with obeying written warnings.

In the

warning compliance context such obeyance usually involves
taking precautionary measures to a potential problem, rather
than reacting to fix an existing problem. As an example of
research that investigated the effect of cost on warning
compliance, Wogalter, McKenna, and Allison (1988) showed a
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positive relation between cost and compliance, by conducting
two experiments whereby subjects were required to mix
chemicals.

As a reflection of cost, some subjects had to go

to greater lengths to use the provided protective gear
(gloves and mask).

The researchers found that merely

requiring subjects to walk 25 feet to another room lowered
warning compliance.
et al (1987).

These findings echoed those of Wogalter

Later, Dingus, Hathaway, and Hunn (1991)

looked at the cost-compliance relationship, achieving similar
findings in the household consumer product and recreational
vehicle environment.

It is possible that the cost variable

may contribute to an operator's willingness to accept a
warning as unnecessary and allow it to go unheeded.
Finally, some work involves the investigation of overall
levels of perceived riskiness of a product or situation.

In

particular, DeJoy (1991) has proposed a model relating an
operator's risk assessment and the use of precautionary
measures.

That model proposes that subjects progress through

four stages following exposure to a hazardous product:

1)

awareness of the hazard, 2) personal risk assessment, 3)
decision making, and 4) precautionary behavior.

His model

stresses the second step of this process, because it takes
into consideration the individual differences of the
subjects.

DeJoy recommends that further data be obtained to

examine the validity of his model.
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Because perceived situational riskiness affects written
warning compliance, it probably also affects the cry-wolf
effect for alarms.

Specifically, if there is perceptual

inconsistency between alarm saliency and the expected
consequences of failure to heed the alarm, then an operator
may develop an unresponsive attitude similar to that found in
a warning compliance situation.

In such a case, future

compliance with similar alarms and situations may decrease.
Although there are a number of similarities between
warning compliance research and responses to visual or
auditory alarms that may be relevant research questions,
there are also a number of differences that may limit
generalization of findings from one field to the other.
First, traditional written warnings are of a more or
less permanent nature; a warning label stays where it is,
unless it is removed.

Therefore, the intended receivers of

the warning information remain confronted by the warning as
long as they remain in that situation.

In contrast, the

alarms traditionally associated with the cry-wolf syndrome
are of a transient nature.

For example, most alarm sounds or

lights in aircraft cockpits are designed to activate upon an
abnormal condition, then deactivate either when the condition
is remedied, or after a certain time period, so as to avoid
unnecessary distraction from the primary task of flying the
airplane

(Berson et al., 1981).

Such a difference may alter

the attentional component from one of passive disregard (for
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warnings) to active disregard (for alarms).

However, enough

false alarms (cry wolf situations) may result in passive
disregard of alarms as well, e.g., the power outage blinker
on a VCR.
Another difference between product label warning
applications and other light or sound-based alarms concerns
the required response associated with each.

As DeJoy (1989)

rlotes for product label warnings, researchers generally
measure degree of compliance by noting the extent to which
subjects heed the indicated precautions.

Therefore, in those

instances, a dangerous situation does not yet exist; rather,
it is assumed that by some precautionary measure, subjects
may actually avoid the situation altogether.

Thus, non-

compliance may be primarily stimulus inattention or
habituation.

In contrast, during an alarm situation the

measure of effectiveness usually revolves around the response
to a present or very imminent danger.

In such a

circumstance, non-occurrence of the alarmed threat is
actually the basis for the cry-wolf phenomenon, in that it is
the classic condition for response extinction.

In product

label situations, however, it is likely that by Il.Q.t. knowing
if a precautionary response was useful or not, the response
is likely to reoccur, unextinguished.
Highlighting the differences between warning compliance
and alarm research is not meant to dissuade researchers from
pursuing cry-wolf research in a written warning domain.

To
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the contrary, it is desirable to generalize findings from
transient alarm research in a complex task environment to a
written warning environment, because of the strong
similarities.

However, it is prudent that such

generalizations be made with appropriate caveats for the
differences that exist.

Indeed, a viable (even recommended)

line of research might investigate the differences between
subjects responding in the two environments, noting
similarities and differences.

Risk Management
Some work quantifying false alert responses (alarms
and/or warnings) comes from the risk management literature
(c.f., -Pate-Cornell, 1986; Rogers, 1987).

Risk management is

concerned with reducing the threat of hazardous events. This
is done by decreasing the frequency of those events, or by
minimizing the severity of their consequences.
In her (1986) paper, Pate-Cornell states that an
analysis of alert systems must include two aspects:

the

first is an assumed relation between the system threshold and
lead time (e.g., the lower the threshold the longer the lead
time); the second is a link between human response and past
performance of the alert system.

The second aspect is the

very essence of the cry-wolf phenomenon.

Pate-Cornell goes

on to describe the threat that cry-wolf situations pose by
inhibiting responses to emergencies, from apartment building
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fire alarms, to engine fire alarms in the cockpit, to even
public announcements of health dangers.
Pate-Cornell presents strategies to tap alert
effectiveness, taking into consideration human memory of the
past performance of a alerting system.

By doing so, she

att~mpts to expand conventional alert system evaluation
(based only on detection efficacy and alert parameter
suitability) by including statistical models of human
response based on memory of past alert reliability.
Although Pate-Cornell's (1986) work is to be commended
for its objectivity and timeliness, it is still largely
theoretical.

She mentions some existing work that applies

her model in various situations (c.f., Claudio, 1985; Pate,
1985); however, this work is still in its infancy, and tends
to focus primarily on societal alerting systems.

Signal Detection Theory
As noted earlier, Signal Detection Theory (SDT) offers
researchers a way of analyzing the uncertainties associated
with alarm systems.

Such an approach posits the alarm as the

signal to be detected, amongst ambient noise. Moderating that
detection are various personal and sitµational factors that
affect the detectability of the signal.
Traditional Signal Detection Theory is concerned, by
definition, with signal detection variables.

By contrast,

the problem in the cry-wolf effect is a response issue;
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operators do not respond, because of acquired mistrust of the
alerting system.

Although such a difference might logically

preclude researchers from using SDT to study cry-wolf issues,
Sorkin et al.

(1988)

employed a dual-task paradigm whereby

Signal Detection Theory was used to evaluate the responses of
subjects to "Likelihood Alarm Displays"

(LAD's); displays

that indicated the probability of a "signal".
Each LAD consisted of four computer-generated numbers
ranging from Oto 8.0 and presented on the bottom of a
computer screen.

Each set was drawn from either a "signal"

distribution, having a mean of 4.0, or a "no-signal"
distribution, having a mean of 3.0.

Therefore, higher

numbers would generally indicate a greater probability of a
signal.

Subjects' performances were evaluated both on the

signal evaluation task described above and on a primary zeroorder tracking task.

Subjects were aided in their signal

detection task by an automated monitor.

The monitor would

alarm the operator (visually/aurally, with varying degrees of
urgency)

if, according to the LADs, the probability of a

"signal" exceeded its internal preset threshold.

Subjects,

then, were to use the automated monitor information in
conjunction with their own evaluative procedures, to
determine the presence or absence of a "signal".
Sorkin et al.

(1988) used the d' measure in Signal

Detection Theory to evaluate subject performances on the
alarm response task,

finding that the automated monitor did

25
indeed improve subject detection and tracking task
performances.

Apparently, having an automated aid enabled

subjects to devote more resources to the primary tracking
task, while improving their accuracy on the secondary
detection task.
The cry-wolf phenomenon may be investigated in a similar
fashion.

However, instead of using LADs as in Sorkin et

al. 's (1988) experiment, subjects would be required to
estimate the likelihood of a true or false alarm simply based
on expected or past alarm performance, as is typically
encountered in actual situations.

In this way, the four

conditions represented by Signal Detection Theory (true
positive, false positive, true negative, or false negative)
would be represented.

Sorkin's dual-task SDT paradigm,

appropriately modified, then should provide a realistic task
with competing demands for a cry-wolf investigation.
A particularly relevant theory of alarm response
behavior was illustrated by Sorkin and Woods

(1985).

They

modeled combined human-automation detection of signals as a
signal detection system.

They found that overall detection

system performance is highly dependent on the human's
detection strategy and the automated detection threshold.

Factors Influencing the Cry-Wolf Phenomenon
Although many psychological theories acknowledge the
existence and importance of the cry-wolf phenomenon, there
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has been relatively little empirical research concerning it.
In order to fully understand the cry-wolf effect, research is
needed to investigate factors that influence the effect, so
that its onset, magnitude, and consequences may be predicted.

Researched Factors
A group of studies conducted by Breznitz and his
colleagues was discussed earlier (cited in Breznitz, 1983).
Their work concentrated on many aspects of the cry-wolf
effect, including the role of operator expectancy
(readiness), the effect in divided attention (dual-task)
situations, and behavioral modifications exhibited following
a cry-wolf effect.

Breznitz ' s work is important, because it

considers theoretical implications of the cry-wolf effect.
However,

it approaches the effect from a psychophysiological

viewpoint; there is very little mention of empirical task
response measures.

Therefore, his work lacks important

empirical backing.
Some investigators (c.f., Pate-Cornell, 1986, p. 223)
have acknowledged that the cry-wolf effect may produce a
cessation of response.

However, in situations where the

consequences of not responding to a signal are highly
critical

(i.e., aviation, medical care units, etc.), mistrust

in the alerting system may be manifested in less drastic
ways, such as a degradation, rather than a cessation, of
response.

Thus, a consideration of the subtler aspects of
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alert responses may be needed, especially in potentially
dangerous complex task situations.

What are the factors that

affect the magnitude and potency of the cry-wolf effect, and
how may designers of alerting systems minimize those
consequences?
Some research, although not directly involved with the
cry-wolf effect per se, is still important in its
consideration.

Particular examples are research by Drazin

(1961), Klemmer (1957) and Miller and Anbar

(1981).

These

researchers investigated the role of advanced warning time
and subject expectancy on reaction time to various stimuli.
In their experiments,

subjects were given a preliminary alarm

stimulus that signaled the imminent onset of the primary
alarm stimulus

(i.e., a tone preceding a light, where

subjects respond to the light).

Klemmer (1957)

found that

reaction time to the stimulus reliably increased as a result
of increasing both the foreperiod length, and the uncertainty
of that length.

In contrast, Drazin (1961) determined that

longer foreperiods resulted in shorter reaction times, and
that shorter foreperiods resulted in longer reaction times.
Drazin explained his results by stating that they reflect
subject readiness for the stimulus.
It can be argued that any expected uncertainty about
advanced warning time
hazard)

(the time between alarm and imminent

is in effect a cry-wolf situation.

This is supported

by Klemmer's findings that longer reaction times resulted
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from higher levels of foreperiod uncertainty. These findings
are also explainable by Drazin, who attributed longer
reaction times to decreased subject readiness (uncertainty).
Such decreased readiness might also result from any history
of uncertainty regarding the occurrence of false alarms.
Caution is warranted here, however, in interpreting the
research conducted by Drazin (1961) and Klermner (1957).

They

both used foreperiods that were generally less than five
seconds long (not much uncertainty); in addition, the stimuli
they used were not inherently meaningful to the subjects.

Nonresearched Factors
Although researchers have acknowledged that the crywolf effect exists, and that there is a cessation of response
following a number of unreliable alerts, quantification of
such statements is difficult to find. Therefore, the first
step that any research in this area should address is a
measure of the cry-wolf effect. Breznitz (1983) states that
the intensity of the "False Alarm Effect" may be reflected by
four indexes:

1) physiological measures such as heart rate

or skin conductance, 2) subjective reports about fear and
credibility, 3) amount of protective a9tion taken by
subjects, and 4) performance or performance deficit measures
caused by a disruption of an ongoing task by the alert.
These measures, while providing several approaches,
leave certain questions unanswered.

First, although most of
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these measures make sense for use in theory, there are many
situations where physiological measures or protective actions
may not be adequate (or even appropriate, e.g., a complex
task environment already involving risk such as aviation).
For example, how are reliable physiological measures taken
when the operator baseline heart rate is already elevated by
the primary task of flying itself?

Subjective reports are

likely to be highly influenced by overall experience with the
task or alarm system. Also, in complex tasks, proper
protective actions may differ dramatically according to the
circumstances:

In flying it is highly inappropriate to

expect/reinforce a normal protective reaction of pulling back
on the control yoke for aerodynamic stall recovery.

Finally,

although Breznitz acknowledged the importance of task
performance measures, he makes minimal use of them, relying
instead on physiological measures.
Given that the cry-wolf phenomenon does exist and can be
quantified empirically with performance measures, it is
important to determine the factors of the accompanying
situation or an ongoing task that might influence the
intensity of the effect.

Clearly, there are many potential

factors that might affect the magnitude of the cry-wolf
effect in actual situations. Some of these are related to
human behavior such as the level of operator ·alertness or
motivation, past experience with the primary task and alert
response reliability, and risk taking behavior.

Other
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factors directly relate to the particular task situation,
such as perceived "costs" associated with compliance or noncompliance, the criticality of the primary task, and the
operator's knowledge of the broader task or alert
consequences (i.e., "situation awareness").

Finally, alert-

specific factors such as alert noticeability, prioritization
schemes, and onset/offset patterns may be important to
consider.

Goals of This Research
The aim of this research is to expand the few earlier
false alert investigations into environments where primary
task workload and complexity are high, and where task or
alarm failure may have significant consequences.

By doing

so, the results should build from past research by Sorkin et
al.

(1988) to specify conditions and quantify responses.
Because there has been little empirical work to confirm

and quantify the cry-wolf effect, the first goal of this
research is to create an objective measure and to examine
various levels of alarm system reliability, noting any
associated (hypothesized) decrements in subject response
performance. Completion of this goal should lend empirical
support to those researchers who have suggested the presence
of the cry-wolf effect, based on physiological and subjective
measures (Breznitz, 1983), theory (Pate-Cornell, 1986), or
other less formal observations.
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The second goal is to investigate how increasing levels
of alarm urgency mediate the cry-wolf effect.

As noted

earlier, a major concern of warning compliance researchers
and alarm system designers has been the manipulation of
alerting urgency.

Because so much work has been done to

manipulate alarm urgency in different contexts (i.e.,
Edworthy et al., 1991; Patterson, 1982), and safety concern
is one research goal, study of the effects of different
urgency levels on the cry-wolf effect is warranted.
should supplement research done by Sorkin et al.

This

(1988), who,

as noted before, studied urgency coding of nonverbal alarms
in a dual-task context.

Both alarm urgency coding and the

cry-wolf effect have been identified as important issues in a
variety of contexts (i.e., aviation, automobiles, operating
theaters, nuclear power, etc.).
Keeping the above goals in mind, the proposed research
aims to replicate parts of prior work, to quantify effects by
conditions, and to provide a link between others, using an
empirical framework and complex task measures.

Experimental Approach
To realistically investigate the responses to alarms, an
ongoing primary task is essential in order to control
attention.

Dual-task methodology has been advocated by many

researchers as a valid and useful way to tap intermittent
response performance (c.f., Damos, 1985; Mastroianni &
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Schopper, 1986; Putz & Rothe, 1974).

Indeed, most of the

signal detection and response research conducted throughout
this century has utilized dual-task paradigms.
In complex task situations, the overall scenario is
fairly similar:

The operator is usually continuously engaged

in the complex task (i.e., flying, driving, tool operating,
etc.), and therefore his or her attention is focused mainly
on that task.

In a dual-task paradigm, typically that

ongoing activity is referred to as the "primary task".

Any

other tasks that the operator must attend to intermittently
(e.g., alarm responding) represent an intrusion, and
responding to them typically represents the "secondary task".
As Wickens

(1992) notes, in many dual-task paradigms the

sharing of resources between primary and secondary tasks can
be continuous or partial; however, alarm responding usually
is thought to resemble a selective attention paradigm, where
attention in toto is transferred from the primary task to the
alarm, and back again.
However, given that some alarms may be false or
relatively unimportant, additional decision factors come into
play that may inhibit responding or make attentional
switching incomplete, so as to degrade .performance.

Thus, it

is possible that certain conditions might negate responding
or might interfere with certain primary and secondary
responses.

Therefore, the fundamental issue addressed by

this research concerns how varying levels of alarm system

33

reliability and task urgency affect the attentional shifting
from primary to secondary tasks as evidenced by response
measures.
Because the research by Sorkin et al.

(1988) addressed

urgency coding and response in a dual task paradigm, that
work provides an appropriate starting point from which to
expand.

In their work, Sorkin et al.

(1988) used a dual task

methodology in conjunction with Signal Detection Theory to
investigate likelihood coding as a form of improving alarm
effectiveness.

In their discussion, Sorkin et al. point out

that, although much research has investigated the proper
formatting and structure of alerting systems, few researchers
have acquired enough empirical data from human operators, in
order to adequately test theories.

This research should

provide data, both for the evaluation of theory and for the
use in design by the quantification of the effect of alarm
uncertainty on human responses.

Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1
Commensurate with the goals of this research listed
above, the proposed research will investigate several issues.
The first question is perhaps the most pertinent for the crywolf effect:

What is the effect of decreasing alarm

reliability on alarm response performance?

Put another way,
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how do increasing numbers of false alarms alter operator
speed and accuracy?

The first hypothesis proposed in this

research states that as alarm reliability decreases, alarm
response in terms of speed and accuracy also will worsen.

It

is assumed that less attentional resources will be devoted to
alarm responding as the likelihood of a successful outcome is
diminished (i.e.~ the cry-wolf effect).

Hypothesis 2
The second issue concerns another possible influence on
alarm response behavior.

As alarms in this experimental

approach are coded to reflect three urgencies , i t

is

important to know if those urgencies do indeed affect

(alarm)

performance as designed. The specific prediction is that, as
alarm urgency increases, alarm response speed and accuracy
will improve.

Because applicable color and aural standards

were used to fabricate the alarms according to the three
levels of urgency, it is assumed that higher-urgency alarms
will appear more salient (important) to the operator,
resulting in faster

(and more accurate) alarm responses.

Hypothesis 3
The third interest is essentially the dual-task
complement to the first issue listed above:

What is the

effect of decreasing alarm reliability on primary task
performance, both for speed and accuracy?

Assuming that
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first argument made above is correct (that operators will
devote less resources to alarm response if reliability is
low), a limited resources model of cognitive functioning
would suggest that more resources will be available for
subjects to devote to a primary task.

Therefore, it is

predicted that primary task performance will improve as alarm
reliability drops.

Hypothesis 4
Finally, given that the first

(cry-wolf) hypothesis is

correct (that there is a degradation of alarm response
performance as a result of decreasing alarm reliability), it
is important to know what other alarm-specific factors
influence the presence and potency of that effect.

As

mentioned earlier, because urgency is so closely related to
alarm effectiveness, it is important to discern its influence
on the cry-wolf effect.

The hypothesis proposed here is that

as alarm urgency increases, alarm response time and errors
will decrease, regardless of system reliability.

This

assumes that if the alarm is critical enough, relative to the
primary task, the consequences of not responding to a true
alarm would be too great, and the response effort will be
made, even though a false alarm is expected.
urgency can overcome the cry-wolf effect.

In effect,

METHOD

subjects
To determine the number of subjects needed to achieve an
experimental power of .80, a power analysis was conducted,
following the procedures recommended in Cohen (1969).
Because the experimental design used in this research is a 3
X 3 mixed design, there are no power analysis approaches in
Cohen (1969) that are uniquely appropriate.

A very

conservative approach might have been to use the method
listed in Appendix A of Cohen (1969) for a between-subjects
design; that method suggests that using 20 subjects per
experimental cell would ensure a power of .80. Because 20
subjects per cell might have been too conservative, that
number was reduced.

Consequently, it was determined that 15

subjects per cell would be needed, for a total of 135.

In

order to keep the same number of subjects in each group, and
the same number of males and females in each group, the total
number of subjects used in this experiment was 138 (46
subjects per reliability group; 23 each of males and
females).
The subjects used in this research were students from
the University of Central Florida.

The average subject age

was 23.8 years, and each person was screened by demographic
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questionnaire to insure adequate vision and hearing (one
subject was not allowed to participate because of subnormal
hearing).

Subjects were dra~n from a variety of sources,

including undergraduate psychology classes, and received
extra credit for participation, as per prior arrangement with
their instructors.

In addition, a monetary bonus was

available, awarded on the basis of the subjects' primary and
secondary task performances.

Subjects gained or lost money

for each alarm response (appropriate or inappropriate,
respectively); the resulting bonus was awarded only if
subjects kept their primary task speed and accuracy within
one standard deviation of baseline (familiarization)
performance.

All 138 subjects received the monetary bonus.

Apparatus

Primary Task
It was necessary for the primary task to be challenging,
so that the effort expended by the subjects to perform it
(and respond to the alerts) would demand a level of sustained
attention as is required in most complex task situations.
All subjects performed a set of complex psychomotor
activities as the primary task, while being presented with
the secondary (alarm) task.

This primary task was a subset

of activities drawn from the Automated Performance Test
System (APTS, hereafter DELTA) battery (see Bliss, 1989);
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specifically, the Simultaneous Pattern Comparison test, and
the Manikin test.
In the following discussion, the term "trial" refers to
a presentation of an DELTA image on the screen to which
subjects should respond.
collection of trials.

The term "block" constitutes a

A 315-second version of each of the

two DELTA tests was included in each of three blocks, to
produce three blocks of trials, with each block lasting
approximately 10 minutes.

Tests drawn from the DELTA battery

have the advantages that 1) they have a history of stability
(Jones, 1980), 2) their novelty minimizes the likelihood of
prior experience and thus minimizes differences in task
loading between subjects, and 3) the tasks are largely
continuous, so that alarms did not occur during lulls in
operator concentration.

The particular DELTA subtests chosen

are described below.

Simultaneous Pattern Comparison <PC}.
Comparison Test

(Klein

&

The Pattern

Armitage, 1979), which measures

factors relating to target acquisition and visual search,
requires the subject to examine a pair of eight-dot patterns
and to determine whether they are "same" or "different."
Patterns are randomly generated with similar or different
pairs and presented simultaneously.

Performance is scored as

errors (the number of pairs incorrectly identified as similar
or different), as well as a measure of average response
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latency (in milliseconds from the appearance of the two
patterns until a response is made).

Pattern Comparison is

described by Bittner, Carter, Kennedy, Harbeson, and Krause
(1986) as a spatial ability important to perceptual
performance.

A review of Pattern Comparison studies by

Bittner et al.,

1986,

indicated that the PC test is

acceptable for use in repeated-measures research.

Manikin <MKl.

The Manikin test

(Benson & Gedye, 1963)

involves the presentation of a simulated human figure facing
either forward or backward.

The subject's task is to

determine which hand of the figure holds one of two patterns
and to respond by pressing the appropriate arrow key. Figure
orientation, hand, and pattern type are randomly determined
for each trial.

Performance is based on the number of

incorrectly matched pairs and latency scores reported in
milliseconds from the time the stimulus appears until a
response is made.
et al.

(1986)

The Manikin test,

recommended by Bittner

as a perceptual measure of spatial

transformation of mental images,

strongly taxes spatial

abilities as does the Pattern Comparison test.
In research conducted by Turnage, Kennedy, Gilson,
Bliss, and Nolan

(1988), the Pattern Comparison and Manikin

tests were found to be reliably predictive of complex task
(flight simulator) performance.
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Because the DELTA subtests were not initially programmed
to offer individual trial data, reprogramming was necessary
to alter the tasks.

Consequently, averaged and individual

trial data were obtained from both Manikin and Pattern
Comparison.

Alarm Stimuli
Alarm stimuli reflecting three levels of urgency were
generated for this research, using Supercard 1.6 software on
a Macintosh IIsi 5/80 computer.

For redundancy, concurrent

auditory and visual alarms were generated.
benefits:

This provided two

1) the alarms were more likely to emulate the

redundancy of an actual alarm situation, and 2) operators
were more likely to detect the alarms, even without looking.
Use of visual-aural redundancy has been supported by Berson
et al.

(1981)

for application to cockpit alarms, and other

researchers have noted that multi-modal stimulation aids
alarm detection

(Boucek, Erickson, Berson, Hanson, Leffler, &

Po-Chedley, 1980).
In this research, each computer-generated visual alarm
consisted of a 5.5" X 9",

rounded-corner,

on a 7.5" X 9.75" rectangular background.
printed in black capital letters

rectangular panel
A textual message

(48-point Helvetica font)

on

the alarm panel indicated the urgency of the alarm (DANGER!!,
WARNING!, or NOTE).

The choice of Helvetica font type is

supported by the American National Standards Institute for
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product safety signs and labels (ANSI, 1991). The alarm panel
was one of three colors (on a white background),
corresponding to the particular level of urgency (red,
yellow, or green).
Visual alarm color for the high-priority (DANGER!!)
category was red, corresponding to the color scheme
recommended by Berson et al.

(1981) for time-critical cockpit

status alarms (the highest priority).

The American National

Standards Institute (ANSI, 1991) recommends that "Safety
Red", have CIE color coordinates of x = .5959 and y = .3269
(Y = 12.0); in the ambient lighting of the current study,
safet y red's CIE color coordinates were x = .560 and y = .382
(Y

~

41.4). The red used in this study was found to have

color coordinates of x = .469 and y = .381 (Y = 24.7).
For the medium-priority (WARNING!) category, alarm color
was yellow, corresponding to the color scheme recommended by
Berson et al.

(1981)

for moderate-urgency warnings.

The ANSI

specifications for "Safety Yellow" indicate CIE coordinates
of x = .4562 and y = .4788 (Y = 59.10); under current ambient
lighting those coordinates changed to x = .485 and y = .490
(Y = 92.9).

The yellow used in this study was found to have

color coordinates of x = 401 and y = .465 (Y = 51.8).
Finally, alarms for the low-priority (NOTE) category
were green, corresponding . to the color scheme recommended by
Berson et al.
priority).

(1981) for cockpit status messages (the lowest

ANSI states that the CIE coordinates for "Safety
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Green" are x = .2110 and y = .4121

(Y = 12.00); that green,

measured under this study's ambient lighting, measured x
.346 and y = .463

(Y = 43.3).

The green chosen for this

research was found to have color coordinates of x = .343 and
y= .475

(Y=28.7).

The specific text messages

(DANGER!!, WARNING!, and

NOTE) were chosen from research by Wogalter and Silver (1990)
that investigated the ability of various words to generate
arousal.

In that research, selected words were ranked

according to an eight-step scale, with eight as the strongest
level.

The arousal strength of the word "danger" was 6.09;

in comparison, the arousal strength of "warning" was 5.31,
and the arousal strength of "note" was 2.12.
The aural alarms that accompanied the visual alarm
presentation were generated using Hypercard 2.1.
reflected the same three urgency levels:
low,

They

high, medium, and

following the parameters recommended by Berson et al.

(1981).
The high-priority aural was the fire bell recorded from
a B-757 simulator, which is the sum of two frequencies,
and 2000 Hz.

1000

For medium-priority alarms, the aural signal

was a B-757 level B caution siren.
square-wave signals

This consists of two

(250 and 950 Hz.) that are alternately

switched to produce a continuous output of constant
amplitude.

Finally, for low-priority alarms, the aural

stimulus was a recorded "SELCAL" chime from a B-757 flight
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simulator.

This sound is a symmetrical rise and decay of a

580 Hz sine-wave using an exponential amplitude function.
Each signal activated once for the same period of time
(2 seconds), then remained silent.

This insured that

subjects were given the same exposure to all sounds, and that
subjects had the option of responding or not responding to
alarms.

All alarms were presented at an average of

approximately 65-70 dB(A).

Alarm Response
Each subject responded to the alarms using the Macintosh
mouse.

When an alarm activated, a square,

.25" X .25"

respond button (labeled "R") also appeared beneath the alarm;
in addition, the mouse cursor (the arrow) was automatically
centered on the screen.

The response task was to move the

cursor on to the respond button, and then click the mouse.
At that point, response time (in 1/60ths ·of a second) and
position coordinates (x and y) were sent to a data file.

If

no response occurred within 15 seconds of alarm activation,
appropriate codes were sent to the data file, indicating the
lack of a response.

Subjects were given feedback (an aural

message of "CORRECT" or "INCORRECT") about the
appropriateness of their response: If a subject responded to
a true alert or did not respond to a false alert, the
"CORRECT" message activated; if a subject responded to a
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false alert or failed to respond to a true alert, the
"INCORRECT" message sounded.

Procedure
Before participation, each subject read and completed an
informed consent form.

Included on the form were

instructions regarding the protocol and basic experimental
design, time and constraints involved for participation,
payment or credit terms, and risks associated with
participation (see Appendix B).

Subjects also completed a

demographic background information questionnaire, including
items about age, major, and video game and computer
experience (See Appendix C).
After completing the informed consent and background
information forms, subjects received familiarization on the
primary task, and on the alarm system.

Familiarization for

the primary tasks required subjects to complete one 60-second
session for each of the two subtasks (the Pattern Comparison
and Manikin tests).

This served two purposes: First,

subjects learned about the keystrokes and logic required to
successfully complete each subtask.

Sec.and, this allowed

time for subjects to practice and achieve some level of
primary task performance stability before the actual
experiment began (see Turnage & Kennedy, 1992).
Alarm familiarization consisted of instructions
regarding the priority level of each visual-aural alarm
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combination.
alarms

Each subject was given six presentations of

(an example of a true and false alert and the

associated payoffs for each of the three alarm priorities) to
ensure their knowledge of the priority level of a given
alarm, unaccompanied by the primary task.

This also helped

them to understand the contingencies associated with true and
false alarm responses and nonresponses.
Following the familiarization period,
randomly assigned to one of three groups

subjects were

(see Table 1)

Subjects then began the first of three blocks of the
experimental task, accompanied by the alarms.

All subjects

in each of the three groups listed in Table 1 participated in
three sequential task blocks

(each lasting 10 minutes). The

blocks were separated by five-minute rest periods. Within
each block, subjects were presented at various times four
alarms of each urgency,

for a total of 12 alarms within each

block (36 alarms total per subject across blocks).

The

presentation time of the 12 alarms was pseudo-randomly
generated within blocks on a variable interval (VI)

schedule,

with the inter-alarm interval ranging from 25 sec to 75 sec
with the average set at 50 seconds.
from predicting alarm onset.
within each block was random.

This prevented subjects

The sequence of the 12 alarms
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TABLE 1
ASSIGNMENT OF SUBJECTS TO EXPERIMENTAL
(BETWEEN-GROUP) CONDITIONS
GROUP

BLOCKS ONE THROUGH THREE

LOW RELIABILITY
(n = 20)

25% true alarms,

MEDIUM RELIABILITY
(n = 20)

50% true alarms, 50% false alarms

HIGH RELIABILITY
(n = 20)

75% true alarms, 25% false alarms

75% false alarms

During the primary task, subjects were presented the
Simultaneous Pattern Comparison and Manikin subtasks as
described above on a CRT display screen and responded by
pressing the appropriate key on the IBM keyboard ('s' or 'd'
for the Simultaneous Pattern Comparison task and the left or
right arrow for the Manikin task).

An IBM-compatible 386 AT

25 - MHz. computer generated the patterns on a VGA display.
While the subject was engaged in the primary task activities,
alarms were generated on a Macintosh IIsi 5/80 physically
stationed to the right of the subject and located 90 degrees
to the right of the primary task screen.
alarms,

To respond to the

subjects were required to turn to look at the

Macintosh screen, position the mouse cursor on the RESPOND
button, and click the mouse button.

It was necessary for

subjects to look away from the primary task screen to
properly place the mouse.
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Following each alarm, subjects were given 15 seconds to
respond.

Whether or not the subject responded, the alarm

screen disappeared 15 seconds after alarm activation,
replaced by a blank, white screen.

Depending upon the

subject action (response or not) and the nature of the alarm
(true or false), one of two spoken messages was presented
("CORRECT" or "INCORRECT").

These messages informed subjects

of the correctness of their decision, and indirectly of the
validity of the alarm (whether it was true or false).

If the

subject did not respond to the alarm, the spoken message
sounded 15 seconds after alarm activation; otherwise, the
message sounded when the subject made a response.

Also, the

proportionate number of true to false signals confirmed
(within and across blocks) the alarm system reliability (25%,
50%, or 75%) noted in the task instructions.
After completing the three task blocks, the subjects
completed a questionnaire assessing their confidence in the
alarm system (see Appendix E), were fully debriefed, and then
dismissed.

Also at this time, subjects were administered the

bonus payment.

Independent Variables
Two independent variables were manipulated:
reliability and alarm urgency.

system

To address the effect of

system reliability on the cry-wolf phenomenon, different
groups of subjects must perceive the alarm system to be
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differentially reliable.

This variable can not be

manipulated easily in a within-subjects manner, because there
is no insurance that subjects would easily adopt a new alarm
system reliability.

Therefore, alarm system reliability was

varied between groups.
Reliability of the alarm system was indicated as a
percentage of alarms that were true positives.

For each

group of subjects, a deliberately biased preview of system
reliability was given by the initial experimental
instructions (see Appendix D), and later reinforced by the
proportionate number of true to false alarms (previously
described), . which reflected the same reliability as averaged
within and across the task blocks.

Initial pilot testing was

conducted to assess the ~fficacy of this method; those
subjects indicated that the method was indeed successful.
However, as an added measure, reminders of the system
reliability were given to subjects prior to each new block of
trials.

Subjects in the "low reliability"

(25%) group

received 25 percent true alarms and 75 percent false alarms.
The "medium reliability"

(50%) group received 50 percent true

alarms and 50 percent false alarms.

Finally, the "high

reliability" (75%) group received 75 percent true alarms, and
25 percent false alarms.

These reliability values were

chosen to reflect equally spaced increments.

It was expected

that extrapolation would allow these results to be
generalizable to a variety of alarm systems.

To address the
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effect of alarm urgency on the cry-wolf phenomenon, subjects
were presented with alarms of differing perceived importance.
However, unlike alarm system reliability, alarm urgency may
be successfully manipulated as a within-subjects variable.
(Indeed, complex task operators often experience alarms of
varying urgency within short periods of time.)

Therefore, to

increase experimental power, urgency of the alarms was a
within-groups factor. Subjects experienced three levels of
urgency:

low, medium and high.

In most situations, alarms reflect varying degrees of
consequences if not responded to in a timely manner.

For

example, if a highly critical alarm is ignored, injury or
death may result.

However, if an alarm of lesser importance

is ignored, the consequences will be less severe.

To

effectively model such contingencies in the experimental
context, subjects were given a "score" of $5.00 at the
beginning of the experiment.

Penalties were imposed on each

subject's score for failure to respond to true alarms, and
for responding to false alarms.

These penalties differed

according to the urgency of the alarm to which the subject
responded (see Table 2).

Conversely, money was added to a

subject's score for responding to true alarms or not
responding to false alarms.

Each subject's running total was

presented on the alarm screen at all times.
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TABLE 2
CONTINGENCY ALGORITHMS FOR ALARM RESPONSES
TRUE ALERTS
RESPONSE TYPE

NOTE

Timely, Accurate

+.10

+.15

+.20

Timely, Inaccurate

+.05

+.075

+.15

Late, Accurate

+.05

+.075

+.15

Late, Inaccurate

+.00

+.00

+.00

No Response

-.10

-.15

-.20

WARNING!

DANGER!!

FALSE ALERTS
RESPONSE TYPE

NOTE

Response

-.10

-.10

-.10

No Response

+.10

+.10

+.10

WARNING!

DANGER!!

Initial pilot testing was conducted to determine if this
algorithm influenced subject behavior as expected or if it
would need modification.
among subjects

Although there was some variability

(some subjects did not seem very motivated by

the money), most reacted favorably.

Dependent Variables
For the primary task, response speed and accuracy was
collected for both the Manikin and Pattern· Comparison
subtests

(see primary task description above).

Response
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speed was the time, in seconds, taken by a subject to respond
to problems on the screen.

Subjects were given 15 seconds to

respond to each trial; after that time the computer advanced
to the next trial, noting an incorrect response and the
maximum response time (15 seconds). Response errors were
measured as the frequency of incorrect trials.

Incorrectness

was caused by the subject pressing an incorrect key, or
neglecting to respond.

These measures were tabulated for

individual trials, and also averaged across blocks.
The averaged scores were collected for each subject and
for each subtask.

Average response measures were then

calculated across subjects in each reliability group (25%,
50%, and 75%).

The availability of individual trial data

also allowed calculation of average response speed and
accuracy for each urgency of alert.
As the most basic measure of alarm response performance,
the numbers of alarms that each subject chose to respond to
was noted.

This data was tabulated for each experimental

group and alarm urgency category, and then plotted across
blocks.
Response speed and accuracy were also collected for
alarm task performance.

Time (in seconds) taken by a subject

to respond to an alarm was measured from alarm onset to
completion of the mouseclick.

For the time variable, if

subjects did not respond within 15 seconds, the data point
was declared missing.

Alarm response accuracy was tabulated
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in two ways:

First, a measure of mouseclick accuracy was

noted (whether or not subjects positioned the arrow on the
respond button).

For this variable, data points resulting

from a lack of alarm response were declared missing, and
therefore not included in the analyses.

The second measure

of alarm response accuracy collected concerned the
appropriateness of subjects' responding.

Under this

definition, subjects' responses were correct if they
responded to true alarms or did not respond to false alarms.
Conversely, responses were incorrect if subjects responded to
false alarms or did not respond to true alarms.
For both the primary subtasks and secondary alarm tasks,
individual trial measures were collected, and were later used
to calculate average response measures across blocks.

This

enabled comparative analyses to be performed between
reliability groups (25%, 50%, and 75%), and between alarm
criticalities (low-priority, medium-priority, and highpriority alarms).

RESULTS
The design for this experiment is a 3 X 3 between-within
(mixed) design, with three levels of alarm system reliability
(low, medium, and high), and three levels of alarm urgency
(low, medium, and high).

Alarm system reliability is the

between-subjects factor, and alarm urgency is the withinsubjects factor.
The first step in the data analysis was to convert all
data to ASCII format, to ease portability into the SPSS-PC+
program for statistical analysis.

For the alarm response

data, this first required converting the data from Macintosh
to IBM format. During that process, data were visually
inspected, to determine whether any anomalies existed due to
computer malfunction.

No anomalies or outliers were found.

Following this step, the DELTA and alarm response data files
were synchronized and ·combined, to determine what primary
task data points corresponded to alarms of each urgency.
Finally, the data files were brought into SPSS-PC+ and
examined to detect any errors.

A small number of data

synchronization errors were found, due to human error in the
file merging process.

These errors were subsequently

corrected before the primary data analyses.
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Alarm Response Fre~uencies
As the most direct and meaningful measure of the crywolf effect, the frequency with which subjects in each
experimental group made responses to alarms was first
examined.

Wide variations were found in response to the

experimental instructions.

From this the first two

hypotheses made earlier were addressed.

Although the

hypotheses did not specifically state response frequency as a
dependent measure, it is a basic and integral part of
performance.
As the first step in the analysis, the observed
percentages of alarm responses were examined and found to
nearly match the stated alarm reliability levels.

This is

known as probability matching in the literature (c.f.,
Herrnstein, 1960; Dorfman, 1969); that is, humans will tend
to match the probability of stimulus occurrence with the same
percentage of responses.

Figure 1 shows that while subjects

did indeed match the stated levels fairly closely, there
seemed to be a consistent bias; subjects responded with
greater frequency than the stated reliability over all
levels.

However, a two-tailed chi-square analysis failed to

show a significant difference between optimal matching and
observed subject performance,
.05.

x 2 (5, N = 138) = 3.653,

~ >

To address the first hypothesis (whether the

manipulations imposed created a cry-wolf effect), this figure
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also shows that subjects in higher alarm system reliability
groups made significantly more alarm responses than those in
lower alarm reliability groups, z2 (5, N = 138) = 23.77, ~ <
.01, one-tailed.

This supports the first hypothesis; as

alarm system reliability dropped, responses to alarms were
degraded.
In Figure 2, similar curves are shown for responses to
low and high urgency alarms.

This addresses both hypotheses

2 and 4, regarding the effect of alarm urgency on alarm
responses, the general saliency of the alarms used, and the
combined effect of alarm urgency and reliability on alarm
responses.

From the figure, it is evident that subjects made

more responses to high-urgency alarms than to low-urgency
alarms, across groups and blocks, z2 (5, N = 138) = 5.16, ~ <
.05, one-tailed.
hypothesis.

Therefore, this finding confirms the second

In addition, because subjects responded more to

high urgency alarms regardless of experimental group, support
is also given to the fourth hypothesis (that subjects would
devote more resources to high urgency alarms, regardless of
their group assignment).
Although, on the average, subjects' responses tended to
match the stated reliability levels (see Figure 1), there
were exceptions. Specifically, there were a percentage of
subjects who chose to respond to all alarms, or to none of
them.

Figures 3 and 4 show that, generally, those subjects

who chose to respond to all the alarms were members of the
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75%

(high)

reliability group; in a like manner, subjects who

chose to respond to none of the alarms were members of the
25%

(low)

reliability group.

As is shown by the figures, the

number of extreme (all or none)
on.

responders grew as time went

By the third block, the extreme responders comprised

approximately 10 percent of the subject population (14 of 138
subjects).
As post-hoc analyses, we chose to look at the effects of
primary task difficulty on alarm response frequencies.

For

the first part of these analyses, t-tests were conducted on
all response measures
accuracy)

as a function of primary subtask (Manikin versus

Pattern Comparison).
78)

(primary and secondary task speed and

The results of those t-tests

(see Page

indicated the Manikin task to be significantly more

difficult than the Pattern Comparison task.

In Figure 5,

response frequency curves are plotted for those alarms that
activated during the Pattern Comparison task, and those that
activated during the Manikin task.

It appears in that figure

that subjects in all alarm reliability groups generally
responded more often to alarms when performing the easier
task (Pattern Comparison) than when performing the harder
task (Manikin).

However, the difference between the two

curves was not significant, x2

(5, N = 138) = .939, ~ > .05,

two-tailed.
Finally, based on the finding that alarms of higher
urgencies were responded to more often across experimental
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groups (Figure 2), and on the (nonsignificant) trend that
showed more alarm responses when subjects were performing an
easier task (Figure 5), we combined the two variables
together; the resulting curves are shown in Figure 6.

This

figure shows that subjects responded more to high-urgency
alarms while performing the easier Pattern Comparison task
than low-urgency alarms while performing the more difficult
Manikin task.

x2 (5, N

The difference was statistically significant,

= 138) = 17.96,

~

< .01, two-tailed.
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MANOVAs by urgency and Group

G XU Alarm Response Dependent Variables
The third hypothesis involves primary subtask
performances.

Those primary task response time and accuracy

measures, and their relation to hypothesis 3, are addressed
in a later section of this report.
To further address the hypotheses concerning alarm
response performance (1, 2, and 4), several Multivariate
Analyses of Variance (MANOVAs) were conducted.

Because the

experimental approach involves a within-groups as well as a
between-groups variable, a MANOVA was used to analyze
repeated measures data.

This is a statistical technique

whereby the levels of a within-subjects independent variable
are treated as separate dependent measures.

According to

Tabachnick and Fidell (1989), the choice between using MANOVA
(profile analysis) and a more traditional univariate repeated
measures ANOVA approach depends on sample size, statistical
power, and robustness of the data with regard to statistical
assumptions (linearity, normality, and homogeneity of the
covariance matrices).

In line with Tabachnick and Fidell's

recommendations, the choice was .made to use repeated-measures
MANOVA, because 1) this research design is somewhat complex,
2) there is an abundance of response data, 3) the repeatedmeasures MANOVA approach is more likely to be robust with
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regard to violations of statistical assumptions, particularly
homogeneity of covariance matrices, and 4) in repeatedmeasures MANOVA, most violations of statistical assumptions
are largely controlled by the use of transformed variables.
In addition to the choice of repeated-measures MANOVA,
the decision was made to analyze data from block 2 only.
Three factors influenced this decision:

First, many subjects

indicated that by the third (final) block of the experiment,
they were quite fatigued; this could have resulted in a lack
of motivation to respond to the alarm task.

Also, most

subjects indicated that during the first block of the
experiment they were becoming accustomed to the primary and
secondary tasks, and had not developed any real strategy for
responding until the second block.

Finally, due to the large

amount of data collected from both the DELTA and alarm
response tasks, it was possible to use only block 2 data
without an appreciable loss in statistical power.

As a

result of these three factors, the data from the second block
were considered to be more representative of true
performance.
Figures 7 through 9 show alarm response speed, accuracy,
and appropriateness as a function of experimental group and
alarm urgency.

For the initial analyses, a set of three 3 X

3 omnibus MANOVAs was conducted (one MANOVA for the alarm
response speed measure, one for the alarm response accuracy ·
measure, and one for alarm response appropriateness).

These
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MANOVAs tested the effects of alarm system reliability and
alarm urgency on alarm response performances

(as the

differential measure for the cry-wolf effect).
The Group X Urgency interaction was not significant for
the speed or accuracy alarm response measures

(~ < .05).

Therefore, examining those data further was not warranted.
However, the alarm response appropriateness measure showed
significant results

(see Table 3).

Effects were noted for

the Group X Urgency interaction, £(4,268) = 3.62,

< .01,

~

and for the main effects of Group, £(2,135) = 15.35,
and Urgency, £(2,134) = 17.13,

~

~

< .01,

< .01.

TABLE 3
GROUP X URGENCY MANOVA SUMMARY TABLE -- ALARM RESPONSE
APPROPRIATENESS
EFFECT

WILKS

HYP. DF

ERR. DF

F RATIO

SIG. OFF

G X U

.900

4.00

268.00

3.62

.007

G

N/A

2.00

135.00

15.35

.000

u

.796

2.00

134.00

17.13

.000

To further examine the significant effects of Group and
Urgency on alarm response appropriateness, linear and
quadratic trend analyses were conducted on those significant
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effects involving the within-subjects variable Urgency. There
was a significant quadratic component to the interaction of
Group and Urgency (L = -2.71,

~

was not significant (~ > .05).

< .01); the linear component
For the main effect of

Urgency, there was both a linear {~ = 3.06,
quadratic {~ = 4.42,

~

~

< .01) and

< .01) trend; that is, as alarm

urgency increased, the appropriateness of alarm responses
rose in both a linear and quadratic fashion. Examination of
Figure 9 reflects this, with all three groups' scores rising
across levels of alarm urgency.
Also evident from the figure is the marked difference
between the 25% group and the 50% and 75% groups:

While the

25% group shows a markedly linear pattern, the other two
groups exhibit strong quadratic patterns.

Post-hoc

comparisons were also performed on the Group between-subjects
variable {two-tailed), to see the causes of the main effect.
Specific contrasts were conducted between the 25% and 75%
group, and between the 25% and 50% group.

For the 25% - 75%

comparison, there was a significant group difference
4.21,

~

(~ =

< .01); the means from Figure 9 show subjects in the

75% group scoring higher than the 25% group over all alarm
urgencies.

However, the 25% - 50% comparison was not

significant {L = -1.01,

~

> .05).

From this,

it is assumed

that subjects in the 75% group scored significantly higher on
alarm response appropriateness than the 50% group, because

68
the means for the 50% group are lower than those for the 25%
group.
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G XU Primary Task Dependent Variables

Manikin vs, Pattern Comparison t-tests,
Because all subjects performed both the Manikin and
Pattern Comparison subtasks, it was decided to determine
whether performance differences existed between the two sets
of scores (to see whether one test was more difficult than
the other).

To accomplish this, two-tailed t-tests were

conducted on all primary and secondary task performance
variables, as a function of primary subtask.

The results of

these tests are depicted graphically in Figures 10 through
14.

For the primary task accuracy measure, there was a

difference between means of .0418, as a percentage of correct
DELTA trials, with significantly fewer accurate Manikin
(~ = 3.16,

trials than Pattern Comparison trials
Figure 10).

n

< .01;

Similarly, average response time for Manikin

trials was significantly greater than for Pattern Comparison
trials (L = -5.44,

~

< .01; Figure 11).

In addition, most alarm responses were more degraded
when accompanied by the Manikin subtask than when accompanied
by the Pattern Comparison subtask.

In Figure 12, it is shown

that the average response time for Pattern Comparisonaccompanied alarms was 9.31 seconds; for Manikin-accompanied
alarms it was 9.94 seconds.
significant (L = -6.15,

~

This difference is statistically

< .01).

Also, although not

significant statistically (L = 1.72,

n

> .05), Pattern
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Comparison-accompanied responses appeared more accurate than
Manikin-accompanied responses (Figure 13).

Finally, the

alarm appropriateness measure (Figure 14) shows a reversal of
the trend of degraded responses when performing the Manikin
subtask.

Pattern Comparison-accompanied responses were

approximately 57 percent appropriate; Manikin-accompanied
responses were approximately 61 percent appropriate (L =
-3.13,

~

< .01).

Because of the difference in difficulty between the two
primary subtasks, analyses conducted with scores that are
pooled from both the Manikin and Pattern Comparison subtasks
would not be interpretable.

Therefore, the choice was made

to use only Manikin scores as indicators of primary task
performance.

Manikin was chosen because those scores showed

a generally higher variability (the standard deviation for
subjects' mean Pattern Comparison response time was .86; for
Manikin it was .89; the standard deviation for subjects' mean
Pattern Comparison accuracy was .044; for Manikin it was
.155).

This indicates that group differences, if they exist,

would be more evident when using the results from the Manikin
subtask.

In addition, the Manikin subtask, because of its

higher difficulty, is more representative of a complex task
environment.
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MANOVA Analyses,
The next analyses addressed the third hypothesis.

It

consisted of two 3 X 3 MANOVAs, to determine Block 2 Manikin
primary task performance as a function of alarm system
reliability and alarm urgency.

One MANOVA was calculated

with Manikin response speed as the dependent measure (Figure
15), and the other was calculated with Manikin response
accuracy as the dependent measure (Figure 16).

TABLE 4
GROUP X URGENCY MANOVA SUMMARY TABLE -- MANIKIN RESPONSE
SPEED
EFFECT

WILKS

HYP. DF

ERR. DF

F RATIO

SIG. OFF

G X U

.041

4.00

268.00

2.53

.041

G

N/A

2.00

135.00

17.47

.000

u

. 979

2.00

134.00 .

1. 4 7

.234

As is evident from Table 4, there was a significant
Group X Urgency interaction for Manikin response speed,£
(4,268) = 2.53,

~

< .05; however, the same interaction was

not significant for accuracy (~ < .05).

The significant

speed interaction was shown to be due largely to a
significant main effect of experimental group,£ (2,135)

80

17.47,

~

< .01.

Figure 15 shows that the group differences

were probably due, once again, to the 25% group, which showed
a markedly different pattern from the other two groups.
Post-hoc comparisons between the 25% group and the others
supported this
.01).

(for the 25 - 50% comparison,~= -4.32,

~

<

Therefore, the 25% group responded significantly

faster to alarms of all urgencies than either of the other
groups.

There was no significant difference between Manikin

response time for tne 50% group and the 75% group (~ > .05).
Because the interaction for Manikin accuracy was not
significant (~ > .05), no further analysis of accuracy was
performed.
Because the main effect of Urgency was not significant
for either response speed or accuracy (~ > .05), trend
analysis was not performed on the within-subject variables.
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MANOVAs by Block and Group
To provide a framework by which learning effects could
be assessed, it was necessary to compute means and standard
deviations for all dependent variables for each experimental
group across blocks.

The means were calculated for those

variables corresponding to alarm responses, and those
corresponding to primary task performance.

For the DELTA

tests, it was decided to examine those Pattern Comparison and
Manikin performances which were accompanied by alarms, and
those which were not, to demonstrate the differences in means
and trends as subjects were given additional responsibilities
(alarm onset).

Because experimental Block is a within-

subjects variable, the same type of MANOVA analyses were used
as were used for the Group X Urgency analyses; however,
because these analyses were conducted post-hoc, and to
simplify the interpretability of the results, these analyses
were not combined with the Group X Urgency MANOVAs.

G X B Alarm Response Dependent Variables
The resulting graphs of means for the alarm response
performances

(accuracy, speed, and appropriateness) are found

in Figures 17 _- 19.

Neither alarm response time nor accuracy

showed a significant interaction for block and group (p >
.05). Therefore, further investigation was not warranted.
Figures 17 and 18 illustrate this, showing little difference
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between groups, and little change in alarm response time or ·
accuracy for each group as a function of block.

Table 5

presents the summary MANOVA statistics for alarm response
appropriateness as a function of group assignment and
experimental block.

In contrast to the speed and accuracy

measures, there was a significant interaction between block
and group,£ (4,268) = 8.15,

~

< .01, followed by significant

main effects for both variables [for Group, £(2,135) = 92.79,
~

< .01; for Block, £(2,134) = 12.22,

~

< .01; see Figure

19] .

TABLE 5
GROUP X BLOCK MANOVA SUMMARY TABLE -- ALARM RESPONSE
APPROPRIATENESS
EFFECT

WILKS

HYP. DF

ERR. DF

F RATIO

SIG. OFF

G X B

.795

4.00

268.00

8.15

.000

G

N/A

2.00

135.00

92. 79

.000

B

.846

2.00

134.00

12.22

.000

To determine the nature of the interaction and the main
effect of block, trend analysis was again employed. For the
Group X Block interaction, significant linear (~ = 4.83,
.01) and quadratic (~ = -2.71,
observed.

~

~

< .01) components were

For the main effect of Block, although there was

<
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no linear component, a significant quadratic trend was found
(L

= -4.90,

~

< .01).

This indicates that, on average,

subjects responded less appropriately in the first and third
blocks, and more appropriately in the second block.
For the main effect of the between-subjects variable
Group, post-hoc comparisons showed the 25% group to have
responded significantly less appropriately than the 75% group
over blocks (L = -9.06,

~

< .01), but significantly more

appropriately than the 50% group (L = 4.28,

~

< .01). Though

not tested, from these comparisons it is evident that
subjects in the 75% group were significantly more appropriate
in their responding than subjects in the 50% group.
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Figure 17 . . Alarm Response Accuracy for All
Groups as a Function of Block.
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Figure 18. Alarm Response Time for All
Groups as a Function of Block.
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Figure 19. Alarm Response Appropriateness for All
Groups as a Function of Block.
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G X B Primary Task Dependent Variables
As with the alarm response data, plots were made of the
Manikin subtask response time and accuracy for each group
across blocks (Figures 20 - 23).

These are separated into

Manikin performance while subjects were presented with
alarms, and Manikin performance without alarms.
For the times when subjects were attending to alarms,
the only significant interaction of Group and Block was
associated with the response speed measure (Figure 20),
£(4,268) = 3.93,

~

< .01.

The

is presented in Table 6.

summary table for that MANOVA

As shown, the significant

interaction was followed by significant main effects of both
the Group, £(2,135) = 10.34,
47.00,

~

< .01, variables.

~

< .01, and Block, E(2,134) =

Subsequent trend analysis showed

that the Group X Block interaction consisted of a significant
linear trend (~ = -2.94,

~

< .01).

The Block main effect was

composed of both a linear (~ = -4.74,
quadratic (~ = 3.80,

~

~

< .01) and a

< .01) component; as subjects

progressed from the first to the third block, their Manikin
performance time decreased.
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TABLE 6
GROUP X BLOCK MANOVA SUMMARY TABLE -- MANIKIN RESPONSE SPEED
(ACCOMPANIED BY ALARMS)
EFFECT

WILKS

HYP. DF

ERR. DF

F RATIO

SIG. OFF

G X B

.892

4.00

268.00

3.93

.004

G

N/A

2.00

135.00

10.34

.000

B

.588

2.00

134.00

47.00

.000

Regarding the Group variable, post-hoc comparisons were
performed to determine the source of the main effect.
Subjects in the 25% group were found to have performed the
Manikin subtask significantly faster than the 50% group
subjects

(L = -3.42,

~

< .01); in addition, there was no

difference in Manikin response speed between the 50% group
and the 75% group (L = -.89,

~

> .05).

From this we may

assume that the 25% group was significantly faster than the
75% group.
For ongoing Manikin speed and accuracy (no alarms),
there were no significant interactions of the Group and Block
variables

(Figures 22 and 23).

Therefore, no further

analyses were performed on those variables.
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Figure 20. · Manikin Response Time for All Groups as a
Function of Block, Accompanied by Alarms.
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Figure 21. Manikin Accuracy for All Groups as a
Function of Block, Accompanied by Alarms.
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Figure 22. Manikin Response Time for All Groups as a
Function of Block, Unaccompanied by Alarms.
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Figure 23. Manikin Accuracy for All Groups as a
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correlations
In addition to the response time and accuracy data
obtained for the primary and secondary tasks, demographic and
post-experimental opinion questionnaire item data were also
compiled and analyzed.
The demographic item questionnaire {Appendix E) yielded
the following information:

Subjects were, on the average,

somewhere between their junior and senior year, had
approximately one hour per week of video game experience, and
eight hours per week of computer experience.

Following

participation, subjects were also questioned about their
attitudes toward the DELTA tasks and the low, medium, and
high urgency alarms.

On the average, subjects considered the

DELTA tasks to be moderately stressful, understandable,
challenging, and stimulating.

For the alarms, subjects rated

the low, medium, and high-urgency alarms on the following
dimensions:

softness {loud= O; soft= 4), triviality

{urgent= O; trivial= 4), inconvenience (timely= O;
inconvenient= 4), influence {reliable= O; unconvincing
4), and encouragement {frustrating= O; encouraging= 4).
Means and standard deviations for the responses are listed in
Table 7.
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TABLE 7
SUBJECT OPINIONS OF LOW, MEDIUM, and HIGH URGENCY ALARMS

ALARM URGENCY

MEASURE

MEAN

S.D.

Low

Softness
Triviality
Inconvenience
Influence
Encouragement

2.36
2.25
1. 99
2.20
1. 84

. 64
.80
.73
.90
.69

Medium

Softness
Triviality
Inconvenience
Influence
Encouragement

1. 62
1. 57
1. 88
1. 71
1. 61

.52
.66
.68
.79
. 64

High

Softness
Triviality
Inconvenience
Influence
Encouragement

1.01
.83
1. 87
1. 49
1.28

.69
.77
1.00
.97
.76

Post-hoc correlations were performed to uncover the
relationships that existed between demographic and opinion
variables and Block 2 alarm and primary task performances.
Also, subject responses to the debriefing questionnaire were
noted and correlated with alarm response performances, to
determine the effectiveness of the system reliability and
urgency influences.

Of the various demographic and opinion

items, those that significantly correlated with performance
are listed in Table 8.

Only two demographic items, subject

gender and computer experience, were. correlated with alarm
response performance.

Males generally had more accurate
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performance, as did those subjects with more computer
experience.
For the DELTA task, those who found it boring typically
had higher alarm response accuracy.

With regard to the

alarms, those who considered the medium urgency alarms soft
had more accurate alarm responses, while those who considered
the high alarms to be soft or unconvincing had more accurate
DELTA responses.

Those subjects who thought the high urgency

alarms trivial were generally slower to respond to alarms.
Finally, those who estimated a greater number of true alarms
had generally quicker alarm response times.
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TABLE 8
SIGNIFICANT CORRELATIONS OF DEMOGRAPHIC AND OPINION ITEMS
WITH PRIMARY AND SECONDARY TASK PERFORMANCES
ITEM

CORRELATE

r

p Level

Gender

Alarm
Response
Accuracy

.18

.04

Computer
Experience

Alarm
Response
Accuracy

.18

.04

IBM
Boring

Alarm
Response
Accuracy

.17

.05

Medium
Alarms
Soft

Alarm
Response
Accuracy

-.19

.03

High
Alarms
Soft

DELTA
Manikin
· Accuracy

-.17

.05

High
Alarms
Trivial

Alarm
Response
Time

·. 21

.02

High
Alarms
Unconvincing

DELTA
Manikin
Accuracy

-.18

.03

Est.
True
Alarms

Alarm
Response
Time

- . 29

.001

DISCUSSION
This experiment had two goals:

to create an objective

measure of the cry-wolf effect, using that measure to examine
decrements in subject performance resulting from the effect,
and to investigate the mediating influence of alarm urgency
on the cry-wolf effect.
Regarding the first goal, the significantly different
rates of responding to alarms for each experimental group
(see Figure 1) indicate that the cry-wolf effect has been
established in this research.

This lends support to

Breznitz's (1983) description of the cry-wolf effect as a
degradation of response.

On the other hand, the existence of

the ten percent subset of subjects who elected to respond to
all or none of the alarms (the extreme responders) supports
the approach that most resembles Pate-Cornell's (1986)
description of the effect as a cessation of response. It is
very likely that the particular form the cry-wolf effect
takes is dependent upon a host of situational or alarmdependent factors.

Probability Matching
The similarity between the obtained pattern of alarm
responses in this research and the "Matching Law'' developed
by Herrnstein (1958, 1960) is intriguing.
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Craig (1978) has
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noted an association between the "vigilance decrement" and
probability matching tendencies.

He states that if subjects

are given probabilities of signal appearance a priori, their
frequency of responding will match the stated probability. In
most vigilance studies, Craig notes that initially the ratio
of responses per signal is high, as subjects are naive
regarding actual signal probability.

According to Craig

(1978), the adjustment of those naive subjects down to the
actual probability level constitutes the vigilance decrement.
Craig's description is very similar to the procedures
followed in this research:

Subjects were given one of three

a priori probabilities of true alarms.

They then exhibited

response frequencies that closely approximated a perfect
match of those probabilities.
Although subject response behavior in this experiment
did approximate ideal probability matching behavior, there
was a consistent trend that has not received much attention
in the matching literature:

Though statistically not

significant, subjects in this experiment tended to overmatch;
that is, their response frequencies were slightly greater
than stated reliability levels.

This trend became

statistically significant when _subgroups were isolated (e.g.,
high-urgency alarm responses).

Regarding the overall

tendency to overmatch, it may be that humans have a general
predisposition to respond to alarms.

Certainly, from birth

certain sounds are designed to convey danger:

A human
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scream, thunder, and sudden, loud noises are just a few
examples.

The involuntary human reaction to these sounds is

usually the same:

an increase in epinephrine, tightening of

the muscles, and pupillary dilation, collectively known as
the startle effect, or "fight or flight" syndrome.
In addition to the above factor, many subjects showed a
tendency to respond to the first alarm in a series,
presumably out of curiosity to "test" the system.

Human

curiosity, in combination with the general tendency for
humans to respond to alarms may explain the difference
between the current experiment's results and optimal
matching.
Once again, there were individual factors.

Although

most of subjects did match the stated true alarm frequency
levels, a minority of the subjects chose to respond using a
different strategy. Specifically, some subjects in the 75%
group chose to respond to all of the alarms given, and some
subjects in the 25% group responded to none of the alarms.
From Figures 3 and 4, it appears that this was a response
strategy that was not immediately adopted, but one that was
followed by more subjects as time progressed.

By the third

block, approximately ten percent of the subjects had become
extreme responders.

In actuality, because the true and false

alarms were randomly presented to subjects (so that they
could not predict a pattern), these extreme responders were
probably choosing an optimal strategy, insuring that they
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were correct 75% of the time.

An issue subject to debated is

whether the subjects choosing to respond in the extreme did
so because of an active decision making process, or because
it was the easiest way to proceed.

It is probable that, for

the subjects responding to all alarms, it was an active
decision, because responding to alarms requires a conscious
effort and diversion from the primary task.

On the other

hand, those who did not respond to any alarms may have acted
on the basis of preoccupation with the primary task (e.g.,
It's just not worth it to respond to something that will only
be true 25 percent of the time), although it is recognized
that this is a higher-level decision as well.
The above results taken as a whole agree with theories
of rational decision making and resource allocation proposed
by some researchers

(c.f., Sorkin

Sandry, & Vidulich, 1983).

&

Woods, 1985, Wickens,

In the current experimental

paradigm, operators are forced to choose between allocating
resources to a primary or secondary task, with
rewards/penalties present for either.
of responding chosen by subjects
extreme responding),

Regardless of the mode

(probability matching or

subjects seem to be attempting an

optimal decision making strategy.
Sorkin and Woods

(1985) describe a mode of responding to

alarms that may account for the results noted above.

Under

this "operator sampling strategy," an operator only responds
to certa~n alarms; the rest are ignored.

This differs from
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Sorkin and Woods'

(1985) d' - allocation strategy, where all

alarms are noted, but with reduced detectability.

Certainly,

the probability matching noted in this research may represent
the former strategy, while extreme responding (to all alarms)
may be an example of the d' - allocation strategy.

Thus, it

is likely that the particular response pattern observed is
simply a manifestation of the strategies highlighted by
Sorkin and Woods'

(1985).

Hypothesis Considerations

Alarm Reliability and Alarm Responses (#1)
The data presented here may represent the first step
towards showing an association between probability matching
and certain cry-wolf situations.

As such, these results lend

support to the first hypothesis stated in the introduction:
As alarm reliability decreases, alarm responses will worsen.
Indeed, the numbers of alarms responded to were fewer for the
50% group than for the 75%, and fewest for the 25% group.
Although less distinct than the results for response
frequency, further support for the first hypothesis comes
from the main effect of group ~or alarm response
appropriateness following its interaction with block.
If the alarm response appropriateness measure was a true
measure of accuracy, presence of the cry-wolf effect might
suggest that subjects in the 75% reliability group would
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respond more appropriately than the 50% group, which in turn
would respond more appropriately than the 25% reliability
group.

In actuality, the appropriateness measure is more a

measure of ability to predict true alarm onset.

As noted,

the 75% group scored significantly more appropriately than
either the 50% or 25% group.

In addition, though not

statistically significant, the 25% group scored more
appropriately on average than the 50% group.
this finding is as follows:

The reason for

First, the 25% and 75% groups

should respond more appropriately, because they are provided
an a priori indication of whether or not to respond.

In

contrast, subjects in the 50% group were essentially clueless
regarding the onset of true versus false alarms.

In

addition, assuming there is a human predisposition to respond
(discussed earlier), it is natural for the 75% group to
respond more appropriately than the 25% group.
There were no additional supporting data for the first
hypothesis.

Although alarm response speed echoed the trend

(by the third block, the 75% group was responding more
quickly than the other groups), the effect was not
significant.

Alarm Urgency and Alarm Responses (#2)
The second hypothesis was once again given the most
support by the response frequency data.

That hypothesis

stated that higher urgency alarms would be more salient and
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therefore command faster and more accurate responses.

As

shown in Figure 2, there was a significant difference between
the number of high-urgency alarms responded to and the number
of low-urgency alarms responded to, across groups.

This is

highly intuitive; it is logical that humans should be able to
discern differences in alarm urgency and respond
appropriately.

In addition, all groups responded

(significantly) more appropriately to high-urgency alarms.
Together, these data support the second hypothesis.

It is

reassuring to note that the manipulations implemented in the
alarm design had the desired effect; unfortunately, no
additional support was offered by alarm response speed or
accuracy.

Although the data values for alarm response speed

indicated the expected trend (faster responses for the highurgency alarms), the difference was not significant.

For

accuracy, there were no significant differences between any
groups.
It is possible that the lack of support shown by the
alarm response speed and accuracy data may be explained by
the specifics of the experimental situation.

In the

instructions, subjects were encouraged to keep their primary
and secondary task response speed and accuracy up to maximum
levels, to insure receipt of the monetary bonus.

For this

reason, subjects were motivated to respond quickly to every
alarm, to minimize the lag time incurred on the primary task.
Therefore, the lack of response time difference between
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alarms of varying urgencies is not very surprising. Also, the
decision to respond to an alarm may have been a similar one
regardless of the particular urgency.

Once a subject had

made the decision to respond, that decision held for all
urgencies of alerts; therefore the time taken to respond did
not differ.
Regarding the accuracy data, it is possible that a
primary influence of accuracy was not the urgency of the
alarms, but rather the demographics of the particular
subjects.

As shown in the post-hoc correlations, both gender

and computer experience correlated significantly with alarm
response accuracy.

This variance may have overshadowed any

possible effect due to alarm urgency.

Alarm Reliability and DELTA Responses (#3)
The third hypothesis stated that as alarm reliability
dropped, primary task (the Manikin task, chosen on the basis
of difficulty) speed and accuracy would improve.

This was

supported in full by Manikin response speed; the 25% group
consistently responded faster to Manikin than the other
groups.

Manikin response accuracy, however, did not show a

similar effect.

The superiority of the 25% group's response

speed is easy to understand, given that they were responding
to fewer alarms.

Their time (and resources) were free to

concentrate on the Manikin task.

It is surprising that

Manikin response accuracy did not show the same trend.

One
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particularly interesting finding, however, involves the
significant effect of block found for both speed and accuracy
measures.

Jones (1980) indicates that DELTA tests generally

achieve response stability fairly quickly; however, the
Manikin response measures reported here were still improving
by the end of the experiment.

Not only had subjects

performed the Manikin test in three sessions for 5 minutes
each, they had also performed one 60-second familiarization
session before experimental participation.

Perhaps the

Manikin's stability was affected by the introduction of the
secondary task (alarm responding).

Alarm Reliability and Urgency (#4)
Finally, the fourth hypothesis was that of an
interaction; it was stated that increased alarm urgency would
result in faster and more accurate alarm responses,
regardless of alarm reliability.

Once again, the data for

alarm response speed and accuracy did not show any
significant trend with regard to the interaction between
alarm reliability and urgency; however, alarm response
appropriateness showed partial support of the hypothesis.
The linear component of the alarm urgency main effect (Figure
9) .shows that high-urgency alarms were responded to most
appropriately, regardless of group assignment.

However, the

quadratic trend for both the 75% and 50% group was
unexpected; it showed a sharp drop for these groups when
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responding to alarms of medium urgency. Why should this be?
Because alarm appropriateness is a measure of the efficacy
with which subjects responded to true and false alarms,
perhaps subjects had a better memory for alarms of extreme
urgencies.

Some subjects indicated that they invoked a

strategy of "counting" the number of true and false
responses, to maximize their response performance.

If this

was true, the saliency of the high-urgency alarms may have
rendered them easier to remember.
The response frequency data addressing this hypothesis
is illustrated in Figure 2. As noted before, it shows that
regardless of experimental group, the high-urgency alarm
response frequency curve was significantly higher than the
same curve for low-frequency alarms.

If the fourth

hypothesis had not held, the lines would not approximate
parallelism, because there would have been differential rates
of responding across alarm urgencies for different groups.
This result suggests that the tendency for humans to respond
to high-urgency alarms may partially overcome the cry-wolf
effect, such that greater responding will ensue across all
groups.

Perhaps this is a function of the innate human

processing of alarm urgency; cr~tical alarms often trigger
involuntary, physiological responses the first time they are
experienced.

By comparison, the cry-wolf phenomenon,

according to researchers such as Pate-Cornell (1986), is
dependent upon past experience (or possibly foreknowledge).
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Without prior knowledge, alarm systems are usually assumed to
be reliable. According to the cry-wolf fable, three nonreinforced trials were required to develop the mistrust that
led to the cry-wolf effect

(no responses).

From the

relationship demonstrated here between reliability and
urgency, the loss due to the cry-wolf effect may not be as
strong as the innate propensity to respond to urgent alarms.
In addition, the cry-wolf effect may prove to be more
malleable than was previously envisioned.

Other Issues
First, concerning primary task performance, the results
presented so far have only considered those DELTA
performances that were accompanied by alarms.

An important

issue concerns whether performance on the DELTA tests was
different between groups during the times when subjects were
not attending to alarms (ongoing DELTA performance).

In

other words, was there a lingering or ambient effect of alarm
reliability?

One might have expected the 75% reliability

group to exhibit lower ambient DELTA performance levels,
because they were expecting more frequent true alarms.
Figures 22 and 23 show Manikin performance for all
groups across blocks, unaccompanied by alarms.

In contrast

to the group differences that were evident when subjects were
presented with the alarms, there were none present when
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subjects were concentrating solely on the primary task. This
pattern is evident for Manikin response speed and accuracy.
Correlations between the opinion questionnaire items and
the primary and secondary task performances revealed findings
that addressed this issue but were largely intuitive.
First, subjects who considered the DELTA task to be
boring had higher alarm response accuracy.

This indicates

that subjects who were not challenged by the DELTA tasks
devoted their resources to alarm responses.

This is logical,

given a limited resources model of cognitive processing
(Wickens, 19 92) .
A second correlational finding adds support to the first
hypothesis:

Subjects who reported a higher number of true

alarms typically had faster alarm responses.

This is also a

manifestation of the cry-wolf effect, because it shows that
those subjects for whom the cry-wolf effect is not present
respond more quickly, placing more faith in the alarm system.
Finally, subjects who considered the medium or highurgency alarms to be soft (less loud) were generally less
accurate on their alarm responses.

This is encouraging,

because it offers support for hypothesis 2, even though the
Group X Urgency MANOVA for alarm response accuracy did not
show significance.

Further support for the saliency of the

alarms is taken from the significant correlations between
alarm triviality and speed of responding, and between
influence of high-urgency alarms and accuracy of alarm
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responses.

Both indicate that as subjects lose faith in the

alarm system, speed and accuracy of alarm responses worsens.

conclusions
The research described in this investigation helps
clarify the nature of the cry-wolf effect for situations
where alarm reliability is known a priori (or perhaps learned
via experience), and where the primary task is reasonably
demanding.

The use of dual-task methodology has proven

successful for the manipulation and measurement of operator
attention and alarm response tendencies. It is anticipated
that the findings reported here may be an aid to designers of
alarm systems as well as researchers in human performance,
showing that most people choose (decide) not to respond to
some alarms based on expectancy, urgency and primary task
workload.

Perhaps this is as it should be.

If an alarm

response was automated to eliminate "human error" then all
false alarms would be responded to improperly, regardless of
the situation or circumstances.
For alarm designers, one important aspect highlighted in
this research is the propensity of subjects to match the
stated alarm reliability level with their responses
(probability match).

As indicated earlier, such matching is

likely the observable result of subjects invoking Sorkin and
· Woods'

(1985) operator sampling strategy.

Because of this,

if consistent responding is desired, alarm reliability (lack
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of false alarms) is of the utmost importance.
reliability factor may work two ways:

However, the

humans may regain

faith in an alarm system as easily as they lose it.

If so,

training may restore people's faith in alarm systems that
have been repaired or fixed or may even make them "extreme"
responders.

Further research should investigate this issue,

by attempting to create a reversal of the cry-wolf effect via
training manipulations.
Another aspect of potential importance to designers may
be the tendency for subjects in this experiment to
"overmatch".

As noted, although subjects matched stated

alarm reliability levels fairly closely, there was a fairly
consistent trend to respond with greater frequency.

Again,

this may be a reflection of a human tendency to respond to
alarms in general.

If this is so (further research should

seek to verify this), it may indicate that humans have a
certain tolerance for alarm failure.

This tolerance may take

the form of a longer "lead" time before the cry-wolf effect
activates, or it may represent a sort of "buffer" or
tolerance for some alarm unreliability. If the latter were
true, alarm designers may have some latitude regarding the
reliability criteria they must design toward (e.g., if humans
overmatch by 10 percent, then alarms Gan be as low as 90
percent accurate, with no loss of operator responding).
of course assumes that responding to false alarms is of
little concern.

On a related issue, subjects in this

This
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research were not given information regarding why an alarm
might be false.

Further research might incorporate such

information, to add complexity and realism to the
experimental situation.
A

third issue pertains to the lack of ambient effect

found for ongoing primary task performance without alarms.
Although it may seem intuitive to expect an overall increase
in operator stress when alarms are presented, such stress did
not linger to affect performance appreciably in this
experiment.

This may bode well for alarm designers; humans

may be able to recover rapidly from interruptions in a
primary task.
Such design concerns are particularly appropriate in
today's alarm-ridden society, with the tendency toward
automation in complex task environments and the resultant
increased numbers of highly complex alarm systems.

Such

systems have the capability to warn about the smallest of
aberrations; however, some design restraint is probably
necessary, lest operators will be responding to more alarms
than is essential, sacrificing valuable attention.
In addition to beneficial information for alarm
designers, certain research domains may benefit from these
findings as well.
First, as noted in the introduction, Breznitz (1983) has
attributed the concept of the cry-wolf effect to either
habituation, or extinction, both tenets of reinforcement
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theory.

Both terms assume an aspect of prior history; for

habituation, there is a period of frequent stimulus
presentation preceding the actual habituation.

For

extinction, there is a period of unreinforced stimulus
presentation preceding the extinction.

In this research, the

behavior of subjects to probability match during the first
block argues against either explanation (habituation or
extinction), because they had no time to form the
associations needed for those theories.

This research

suggests that instructional effects indicating the
reliability level given before the first block may substitute
for experience with stimulus and reinforcement schedules.
Such prebiasing may be an exception to Breznitz'

(1983)

hypothesis.
Also, Pate-Cornell's (1986) research was predicated on
the basis of a key concept stating that there is a link
between alarm response and past alarm system performance.
That concept, while valid for her research, may not address
the cry-wolf phenomenon as a whole, given that this research
was able to demonstrate the effect with no past alarm system
performance.

Perhaps instructions for humans can serve as an

effective substitute for conditioning.
In general, however, the theories postulated by Breznitz
(1984) and Pate-Cornell (1986) have been supported by the
performance data and results here.

Both researchers have

examined situations where subjects are naive with regard to
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the particular reliability of the alarm system. In those
contexts, Breznitz and Pate-Cornell have shown some form of
existence of the cry-wolf effect

(albeit not with an

abundance of performance data).

This work has replicated,

quantified, and expanded upon those findings in another type
of situation, where subjects have prior knowledge of the
alarm system's reliability.
In addition, probability matching has been found to be
the strategy for most subjects and is used to explain the
overall findings.

Quantifiable variations of the matching

effect may lead to a deeper understanding of the underlying
decision processes.

As noted before, researchers in the

field of decis~on making under uncertainty have examined
operator decisions, given certain levels of system
unreliability (c.f., Griffin & Rockwell, 1984; Walker &
Harper, 1990), but without manipulating decision priorities.
The findings reported here may be a valuable addition to that
literature, because of the exact levels of system
unreliability used (and made available to the subjects
beforehand), the introduction of response biases, and actual
performance data used for subject feedback.

Further research

may provide additional links between operator decisions and
operator performances in uncertain situations.
One of the most closely related fields to this research
is warning compliance.

Rodriguez'

(1991) makes the assertion

that most people ignore written warning labels.

Yet, the
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tendency in this research is for subjects to respond beyond
even probability matching.

This may indicate that there are

unique differences in the way humans approach written
warnings and transient auditory/visual alarms. Specifically,
there may be a tendency (the default) for humans to habituate
and not respond to permanently affixed warnings, but to be
stimulated to respond to sudden alarms.

This is logical,

because written warnings warn about a danger that, usually,
does not exist yet.

In contrast, alarms signal an imminent

threat (unless they are false).

This difference makes it

imperative that researchers generalize warning research to
alarm situations with caution.
Another difference between the existing warning
compliance research and responses to alarms is the nature of
the expected behavior.

Warning compliance is concerned with

the likelihood of perceived risk and the tendency for people
to take protective action prior to an activity.

Alarm

research usually focuses on responses occurring after an
activity has been initiated, without much information about
the risk of responding inappropriately.

A natural extension

of this work may be to incorporate notions of risk in the
form of alarm compliance (or not).

By manipulating risks of

not responding to true alarms and of inappropriately
responding to false alarms, it is possible to examine or vary
the cost of alarm compliance. Such an issue was certainly a
factor

in

this experiment (the reward matrix).

Further
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investigation in this area is important in that decisions not
to comply to an alarm might be correct if the alarm is
determined to be false, or like warning compliance, there is
a judgment as to the relative worth of compliance given the
primary task.
The application of Herrnstein's (1960) matching law to
the results of this experiment, in conjunction with Craig's
(1978) findings tying the matching law to the vigilance
decrement and Dorfman's (1969) application of the law to
signal detection theory, indicate a possible expansion of
probability matching to include alarm responding as well.
However, caution in generalizing findings is needed.
Green and Swets (1966) stated that, in typical signal
detection tasks, subjects tend to be overly conservative,
avoiding extreme response rates.

In the current situation,

this indicates that if the alarm system reliability was 75
percent, for example, subjects might respond at a rate equal
to or less than 75 percent. Similarly, if the alarm
reliability was 25 percent, subjects would tend toward·
responding at a rate equal to or higher than 25 percent.
Green and Swets state that this is so because 1) subjects are
disinclined to make the same response on all trials, and 2)
the value gained does not vary appreciably for a wide range
when the signal probability is at an extreme.

Dorfman (1969)

proposes another hypothesis to account for the response
rates:

he states that subjects actually apply Herrnstein's
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matching law.

The current research provides further insights

to these hypotheses and a puzzle as well.
Green and Swets'

In contrast to

(1966) explanation, some subjects faced with

high (75%) or low (25%) reliability values showed a tendency
toward responding at the extreme (the 10 percent who
responded to all or none of the alarms).

The other 90

percent of the subjects supported Dorfman's (1969) hypothesis
regarding probability matching.

The reasons for these

di·f ferent behaviors and their consequences are points of
departure for future research.

Future Research
Although this research answered a number of questions,
it has also raised new questions, theoretical as well as
applied, that are important to the understanding and
prediction of responses to alarms.

The following areas are

of particular interest:
1)

The current results show alarm urgency (criticality)

as a moderator of the cry-wolf effect; future research should
consider the interactive effects of primary task workload and
criticality as well.

This project used two DELTA subtasks of

varying difficulty, and noted (through t-tests) that alarm
responses that were accompanied by an easier task (Pattern
Comparison) were faster.

But alarm response frequency and

accuracy were not affected as expected.

Future research
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should attempt to resolve the discrepancy perhaps by further
increasing the workload differences between primary tasks.
2)

· It is important to emphasize that the procedures

followed in this experiment represent a laboratory scenario.
In actual field situations, there is sure to be much more
concern and thus differences regarding alarm urgency and
reliability, as well as difficulty and criticality of the
primary task(s).

Though this research was designed as a

model of what might happen in a real-world complex task
situation, much more research is needed to cross-validate and
generalize the findings reported here.
3)

On a related issue, in most situations where alarms

are responded to, specific reliability levels are rarely
given to the operator.

If any information is available, it

is usually based on the operator's personal feelings or on
hearsay from other operators.

Because of this, an engaging

question involves whether and how quickly subjects would show
the same response patterns (probability match) if they were
not given a priori indications of alarm reliability.
Alternatively, would most subjects adopt an extreme response
behavior, if the instructions indicate that this would be an
optimal strategy?
4)
used.

Future research should address this issue.

Another question stems from the nature of the tasks
Because the primary and secondary tasks were chosen to

be generic and unfamiliar (there were no actual situational
analogues), subjects in this research may not have felt
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immersed in the situation.

However, to increase the

potential effects of urgency or other variables, future
researchers may want to use primary and secondary tasks that
are more meaningful to the research participant.

Also, in

this research some subjects were confused by the relationship
between the alarms and the primary task.

Future

investigators might consider instituting more of a connection
between the primary and secondary task, to closer approximate
a complex task situation such as piloting an aircraft.
5)

Another aspect of this research that deserves

further investigation is the potency of experimental
instructions to institute and reinforce alarm reliability
values.

It is interesting to note that subjects quickly

adopted the stated reliability values.

Although some

response variability was evident in the first block, the
intergroup differences in numbers of alarms responded to was
as expected for all blocks.

This finding suggests that a

viable area of research may be to train different response
patterns (for example, responding to 75 percent of the alarms
versus responding to all alarms) to alarm systems of varying
reliabiliti~s.

Such training may be particularly attractive

when there are multiple alarms, . or where there is some
ambiguity with regard to alarm priority and validity.

Such

procedures are practiced in aviation training; pilots are
taught to follow certain response patterns given specific
equipment failures or threatening atmospheric conditions.
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6)

In this research there were several data trends that

were not statistically significant.

In many cases, alarm

response speed and accuracy did not support the stated
hypotheses (for example, the superior accuracy of Pattern
Comparison responses over Manikin responses, the faster alarm
responses for the 75% group, and the faster alarm responses
for high-urgency alarms), yet the trend shown was in the
predicted direction.

This could be the disadvantage of

attempting to model alarm urgency in a laboratory situation.
Most actual alarm situations include clear and definite
consequences for both alarm response and nonresponse.

No

doubt a laboratory situation was not as potent a behavior
modifier as would have been desired, and thus may not have
revealed real speed and accuracy effects.
7)

Finally, in addition to varying response

consequences, additional research should seek to replicate
these findings, using a wider range of reliability groups.
In particular, to address Green and Swets'

(1966) assumption

directly, it would be desirable to include a 0 and 100
percent alarm reliability group, to examine the response
trends for extreme alarm reliabilities.

APPENDIX A
Power Analysis Procedures

123
POWER ANALYSIS PROCEDURES
DESIGN:
Mixed two-factor (3X3) design:
variable.

one between, one within

ANALYSES:
Four omnibus (3X3) ANOVAs:
- . One with primary task speed as DV
- One with primary task accuracy as DV
- One with secondary task speed as DV
- One with secondary task accuracy as DV
ESTIMATES OF EFFECT MEANS:
Primary task (DELTA performance)
- Average response speed (standard deviations in
parentheses):
1. 0 (. 5) , 1. 5 (. 7 5) , 2. 0 ( 1. 0) seconds
- Number wrong (standard deviations in paren's):
5 ( 2 ) , 1 0 ( 3 ) , 15 ( 4 ) it ems
Secondary task (alert response performance):
- Average response speed (standard deviations in
parentheses):
1. 5 ( . 7 5) , 3. 5 ( 1. 5) , 5. 5 ( 2. 2 5) seconds
- Number wrong (standard deviations in paren's):
3 (1)
6 (2)
9 (3)
RESULTS:
According to the procedures outlined in Chapter 8 of Cohen
(1969), and based on the projected means above, if the sample
size in each group= 20, then the power for each main effect
would be .80, and the power for the interaction would be .56.
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REFERENCES FOR POWER ANALYSIS:
Estimates of DELTA subtask performance means taken from:
Bliss, J.P. (1989). The APTS battery as a surrogate measure
of tank gunnery simulator performance. Unpublished master's
thesis. University of Central Florida, Orlando.
Estimates of alarm response performance means taken from:
Cardosi, K.M., & Boole, P.W. (1991). Analysis of pilot
response time to time-critical air traffic control calls.
Report No. DOT/FAA/RD-91/20. US Department of
Transportation.
Power analysis procedures taken from:
Cohen, J. (1969). Statistical power analysis for the
behavioral sciences. New York: Academic Press.
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HUMAN SUBJECTS INFORMED CONSENT FORM AND VOLUNTEER AGREEMENT
Subject#
Date- -/ - -/- Group _ _ _ _ _ __
Time of Day

----

I, _______________ , having full capacity to
consent, do hereby volunteer to participate in research
entitled The Cry-Wolf Phenomenon and its Effect on Alarm
Responses conducted within the Department of Psychology at
the University of Central Florida. The implications of my
voluntary participation and the nature, duration, and purpose
of the research, and the method and means by which it is to
be conducted are contained on the reverse side of this form.
I have been given an opportunity to read and keep a copy of
this Agreement and to ask questions concerning this research.
Any such questions have been answered to my full and complete
satisfaction. Should any further questions arise, I will be
able to contact James P. Bliss at 382-2351.
I understand
that I may at any time during this research revoke my consent
and withdraw from the test without prejudice or loss of extra
credit, but I will not be paid the monetary bonus unless I
complete the experimental session.

(Signature, Date)
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HUMAN SUBJECTS INFORMED CONSENT FORM AND VOLUNTEER AGREEMENT
The number of alarms present in complex environments such as
aviation is increasing at a rapid rate, due to available
technology.
These alarms commonly take the form of visual,
aural, or tactile signals that draw a person's attention away
from any ongoing task.
Because of this, it is important that
alarms be designed to be as effective as possible.
The
purpose of this research is to investigate the influences
that cause humans to distrust alarm systems.
You will be asked to perform a computer game three times.
During each time, you will hear and see simulated alarms on
the computer to your right.
Your task will be to respond to
each alert according to directions that I will give you.
Performing the game and responding to the alerts are both
important; the relative importance of each will be explained
before you begin.
The exact schedule that we will follow is listed below:

Time
00
15
25
35
45
55
60
70
75
85

-

Activity
15
25
35
45
55
60
70
75
85
90

minutes
minutes
minutes
minutes
minutes
minutes
minutes
minutes
minutes
minutes

Orientation, completion of forms
Practice on the computer game
Practice on the alarms
Instructions, session# 1
Block# 1
Instructions, session# 2
Block# 2
Instructions, session# 3
Block# 3
Debrief/payment/dismissal

The risks involved in this project are those associated with
viewing standard video display screens.
You will receive credit for participation toward your
psychology class (as agreed to by your instructor); in
addition, a monetary bonus will be given based on your alarm
response and psychomotor task performance.
You are free to
terminate participation in this experiment at any time with
no loss in extra credit.
However, you will not be eligible
to receive the monetary bonus unless you complete the
experiment.
Do you have any questions?

APPENDIX C
Subject Background Information Form
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SUBJECT BACKGROUND INFORMATION FORM
Subject#
Date _ _ / _ _ / _ _
Group_ _ _ _ _ __
Time of Day_ _ __
The purpose of this questionnaire is to collect background
information for subjects participating in this experiment.
This information will be used strictly for this experiment
and for research purposes only. Please complete each item to
the best of your ability. Write "N/A" for any item you can
not or do not wish to answer.
1. Name:

----------------------------First
Last
M.I.
M / F

(Circle one)

2.

Gender:

3.

Social Security Number: - - - - -

4.

What is your age?- - - - -

5. Present grade classification (Freshman, Junior,
etc.)

-----

6.

How many hours per week do you play video games?

7.

How many hours per week do you use computers? _ _ _ _ __

8. Have you ever been diagnosed as color
blind/deficient?- - - - 9.
10.

Have you ever been diagnos~d as having hearing loss?
Are you left- or right-handed? _ _ _ __

APPENDIX D
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SUBJECT INSTRUCTIONS - 25% ALARM RELIABILITY GROUP
Hello. My name is Jim Bliss. Today you will be playing a
game on a computer, which will require you to respond quickly
and accurately to images that appear on the computer screen
(point to IBM computer).
While playing, you will see and hear alarms presented on the
other computer (point to Mac). You need to guess whether
those alarms are TRUE or FALSE, and respond quickly and
accurately to the TRUE alarms by using the Macintosh mouse
[refer to Mac example). To respond correctly to a TRUE
alarm, click on the "RESPOND" button within 5 seconds.
If
your decision is correct, you will receive a monetary reward.
If your decision is not correct, money will be taken away
from you. For alarms you believe to be FALSE, you should not
respond.
Once again, if you are correct, money will be added
to your score; if not, you will lose money.
You will see and hear three different alarms. High-priority
alarms are colored red and accompanied by a siren. Mediumpriority alarms are yellow and accompanied by a bell.
Lowpriority alarms are green and accompanied by a single tone.
The response for all TRUE alarms is the same: click on the
"RESPOND" button. Responding to TRUE high-priority, rnediumpriority, and low-priority alarms will gain you 20, 15, and
10 cents, respectively. Failing to respond to TRUE alerts
will result in a loss of the same amount.
If you click late,
or off the RESPOND button, you will only get half the award.
For FALSE ALERTS, you should NOT RESPOND. If you do not
respond, you will gain 10 cents for each FALSE ALERT;
responding to FALSE ALERTS will cost you 10 cents.
IMPORTANT: As indicated earlier, the alarms will be either
"TRUE" or "FALSE". Depending upon your action, you will hear
a spoken message.
If you respond to a TRUE alarm, or do not
respond to a FALSE alarm, you will hear the word "CORRECT",
since these are both correct decisions; if you respond to a
FALSE alarm or fail to respond to a TRUE alarm, you will hear
"INCORRECT", since these are both incorrect decisions.
You
will begin the experiment with $5.00; each correct response
will add money to that value; incorrect responses, however,
will take money away.
To maximize your money, you should
respond appropriately to each alarm, as quickly and
accurately as you can. Your end score will reflect speed and
accuracy of alarm responses.
IMPORTANT!!
IN ORDER TO RECEIVE THE .MONETARY (ALARM) BONUS,
YOU MUST KEEP YOUR GAME PERFORMANCE ABOVE A CERTAIN LEVEL!!
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DURING YOUR PERFORMANCE, 25% (50%, or 75%) OF THE ALARMS YOU
SEE/HEAR WILL BE TRUE ALARMS; 75% (50%, or 25%) WILL BE FALSE
ALARMS.

APPENDIX E

Debriefing Questionnaire
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DEBRIEFING QUESTIONNAIRE
Subject#
Date _ _ / _ _ /
Group________
Time of Day

-----

Thank you for participating in this research project. Before
you leave, please complete the following items. As before,
your answers are completely confidential.

1.

Please rate the experimental task (IBM game) on the following dimensions:

VERY
STRESSFUL

SLIGHTLY
STRESSFUL

NEITHER STRESSFUL
NOR RELAXING

SLIGHTLY
RELAXING

VERY
RELAXING

x----------------x----------------x----------------x----------------x
VERY
UNDERSTANDABLE

SLIGHTLY
UNDERSTANDABLE

NEITHER
UNDERSTANDABLE
NOR COMPLEX

SLIGHTLY
COMPLEX

VERY
COMPLEX

x----------------x----------------x----------------x----------------x
VERY
CHALLENGING

SLIGHTLY
CHALLENGING

NEITHER
CHALLENGING NOR
SIMPLE

SLIGHTLY
SIMPLE

VERY
SIMPLE

x----------------x----------------x----------------x----------------x
VERY
STIMULATING

SLIGHTLY
STIMULATING

NEITHER
STIMULATING NOR
BORING

SLIGHTLY
BORING

VERY
BORING

x----------------x----------------x----------------x----------------x
2.

Please rate the LOW urgency alarms on the following items:

VERY
LOUD

SLIGHTLY
LOUD

NEITHER
LOUD NOR SOFT

SLIGHTLY
SOFT

VERY
SOFT

x----------------x----------------x----------~-----x----------------x
VERY
URGENT

SLIGHTLY
URGENT

NEITHER URGENT
NOR TRIVIAL

SLIGHTLY
TRIVIAL

VERY
TRIVIAL

x----------------x----------------x----------------x----------------x
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VERY
TIMELY

SLIGHTLY
TIMELY

NEITHER TIMELY
NOR INCONVENIENT

SLIGHTLY
INCONVENIENT

VERY
INCONVENIENT

x----------------x----------------x----------------x----------------x
VERY
RELIABLE

SLIGHTLY
RELIABLE

NEITHER RELIABLE
NOR UNCONVINCING

SLIGHTLY
UNCONVINCING

VERY
UNCONVINCING

x----------------x----------------x----------------x----------------x
VERY
FRUSTRATING

SLIGHTLY
FRUSTRATING

NEITHER FRUSTRATING
SLIGHTLY
NOR ENCOURAGING
ENCOURAGING

VERY
ENCOURAGING

x----------------x----------------x----------------x----------------x
3.

Please rate the MEDIUM urgency alarms oh the following items:

VERY
LOUD

SLIGHTLY
LOUD

NEITHER
LOUD NOR SOFT

SLIGHTLY
SOFT

VERY
SOFT

x----------------x----------------x----------------x----------------x
VERY
URGENT

SLIGHTLY
URGENT

NEITHER URGENT
NOR TRIVIAL

SLIGHTLY
TRIVIAL

VERY
TRIVIAL

x----------------x----------------x----------------x----------------x
VERY
TIMELY

SLIGHTLY
TIMELY

NEITHER TIMELY
NOR INCONVENIENT

SLIGHTLY
INCONVENIENT

VERY
INCONVENIENT

x----------------x----------------x----------------x----------------x
VERY
RELIABLE

SLIGHTLY
RELIABLE

NEITHER RELIABLE
NOR UNCONVINCING

SLIGHTLY
UNCONVINCING

VERY
UNCONVINCING

x----------------x----------------x----------------x----------------x
VERY
FRUSTRATING

SLIGHTLY
FRUSTRATING

SLIGHTLY
NEITHER FRUSTRATING
NOR ENCOURAGING
ENCOURAGING

VERY
ENCOURAGING

x----------------x----------------x----------------x----------------x
4.

VERY
LOUD

Please rate the HIGH urgency alarms on the following items:

SLIGHTLY
LOUD

NEITHER
LOUD NOR SOFT

SLIGHTLY
SOFT

VERY
SOFT

x----------------x----------------x----------------x----------------x
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VERY
URGENT

SLIGHTLY
URGENT

NEITHER URGENT
NOR TRIVIAL

SLIGHTLY
TRIVIAL

VERY
TRIVIAL

x----------------x----------------x----------------x----------------x
VERY
TIMELY

SLIGHTLY
TIMELY

NEITHER TIMELY
NOR INCONVENIENT

SLIGHTLY
INCONVENIENT

VERY
INCONVENIENT

x----------------x----------------x----------------x----------------x
VERY
RELIABLE

SLIGHTLY
RELIABLE

NEITHER RELIABLE
NOR UNCONVINCING

SLIGHTLY
UNCONVINCING

VERY
UNCONVINCING

x----------------x----------------x----------------x----------------x
VERY
FRUSTRATING

SLIGHTLY
FRUSTRATING

NEITHER FRUSTRATING
SLIGHTLY
NOR ENCOURAGING
ENCOURAGING

VERY
ENCOURAGING

x----------------x----------------x----------------x----------------x

5. Please estimate the total number of "true alarms"
saw/heard (how many).

you

6. Please estimate the total number "false alarms" you
saw/heard (how many).
7.

Did you have a strategy for responding to the alarms?
If so, what was it?- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

8. What was the reliability of the alarm system, presented
in the EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS(%)?- - - 9. What was the reliability of the alarm system, based on
YOUR EXPERIENCE with that system(%)?- - - 10. Do you have any other thoughts, feelings, or comments
about this experiment?
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